# Eliminating "Converse" from Converse PDL 

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#### Abstract

In this paper we show that it is possible to eliminate the "converse" operator from the propositional dynamic logic CPDL (Converse PDL), without compromising the soundness and completeness of inference for it. Specifically we present an encoding of CPDL formulae into PDL that eliminates the converse programs from a CPDL formula, but adds enough information so as not to destroy its original meaning with respect to satisfiability, validity, and logical implication. Notably, the resulting $P D L$ formula is polynomially related to the original one. This fact allows one to build inference procedures for CPDL, by encoding CPDL formulae into $P D L$, and then running an inference procedure for $P D L$.


Key words: Propositional dynamic logics, logics of programs, modal logics, decision procedures.

## 1. Introduction

Propositional dynamic logics are modal logics originally developed for specifying and reasoning on program schemata. Over the years, they have proved to be a valuable theoretical tool in many areas of Computer Science, Logic, Computational Linguistics, and Artificial Intelligence (e.g. (Kozen and Tiuryn, 1990; Stirlink 1992; Van Benthem et al., 1994; Van Benthem and Bergstra, 1995; Blackburn and Spaan, 1993; Halpern and Moses, 1992; Friedman and Halpern, 1994; Schild, 1991)). In particular many inference procedures, decidability results, and complexity results in such areas rely on research done within propositional dynamic logics.

In this paper we consider two well-known propositional dynamic logics, namely $P D L$ and $C P D L . P D L$ is the original propositional dynamic logic defined in (Fisher and Ladner, 1979), whereas CPDL, also defined in (Fisher and Ladner, 1979), extends $P D L$ by including a special construct to denote the "converse" of a program. Such a construct allows for the expressing of facts about states preceding the current one, i.e. facts about states that can be reached by executing a given program backward. ${ }^{\star}$

[^0]We show that is possible to eliminate the "converse" operator from CPDL, without compromising the soundness and completeness of inference for it. Specifically we present an intuitive encoding of $C P D L$ formulae into PDL that eliminates the converse programs from a CPDL formula, but adds enough information so as not to destroy its original meaning with respect to satisfiability, validity, and logical implication. Notably the resulting PDL formula is polynomially related to the original one.

This encoding on the one hand helps to better understand the nature of the converse operator. On the other hand it puts the basis to build efficient - in practical cases - inference procedures for $C P D L$. In fact the encoding allows one to build inference procedures for $C P D L$, by translating $C P D L$ formulae into $P D L$, and then running an inference procedure for $P D L$. We discuss this issue further, at the end of the paper.

In fact the technique used for deriving the encoding is quite general. The author has used such a technique to prove decidability and to characterize the computational complexity of several variants of propositional dynamic logics (De Giacomo and Lenzerini, 1994; De Giacomo and Lenzerini, 1995; De Giacomo, 1995), which include constructs as "graded modalities" (Fattorosi-Barnaba and De Caro, 1985; Van der Hoek and De Rijke, 1995) and "nominals" (Passy and Tinchev, 1991; Gargov and Goranko, 1993). Intuitively, the technique is based on two main points. Let the "Source Logic" be $S L$ and the "Target Logic" be $T L$ (in this paper these logics are CPDL and PDL respectively):

1. Identify a finite set of axiom schemata in the language of $T L$ capturing those characteristics that distinguish $S L$ from $T L$ (in the present case such axiom schemata are of the form $\phi \rightarrow[P]\left\langle P^{c}\right\rangle \phi, \phi \rightarrow\left[P^{c}\right]\langle P\rangle \phi$, and force the binary relation interpreting $P^{c}$ to be the converse of that interpreting $P$ ).
2. Devise a function that, given an $S L$ formula $\Phi$, returns a finite "closed"* set of $S L$ formulae, whose truth-values univocally determine that of $\Phi$, and that will be used to instantiate the axiom schemata in (1) (in the present case such a set is simply the Fisher-Ladner closure).
Indeed, by instantiating the axiom schemata in (1) to the formulae in (2), and by making use of the capability (see Theorem 1) of propositional dynamic logics of internalizing axioms - not axiom schemata - we can derive a $T L$ formula (in the present case, the so called PDL-counterpart of a CPDL formula, see below) which corresponds to the original $S L$ formula, in the sense that it preserves satisfiability, validity, and logical implication. If both the cardinality of the sets in (1) and (2) and the size of their elements are polynomially bounded by the original formula, then so is the formula we get. As we shall see, this is the case for the encoding presented here.
[^1]The encoding in this paper is probably the best illustration of this technique, since every step is highly intuitive, and proofs go through without major difficulties, exhibiting the details of the technique in a very tidy way.

## 2. Preliminaries

In this section we introduce the relevant background on propositional dynamic logics.* We mainly focus on CPDL, but all the notions and results we introduce for $C P D L$ can be immediately reformulated for other propositional dynamic logics, including PDL.

Propositional dynamic logics represent a computational process in terms of formulae denoting properties of states, and programs denoting state transition relations. Starting from atomic formulae and atomic programs, which are formulae and programs described simply by a name, complex formulae and programs can be built by means of suitable constructs. The formation rules of CPDL are specified by the following abstract syntax:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \phi::=\top|\perp| A\left|\phi_{1} \wedge \phi_{2}\right| \phi_{1} \vee \phi_{2}\left|\phi_{1} \rightarrow \phi_{2}\right| \neg \phi|\langle r\rangle \phi|[r] \phi \\
& r::=P\left|r_{1} \cup r_{2}\right| r_{1} ; r_{2}\left|r^{*}\right| r^{-} \mid \phi ?
\end{aligned}
$$

where $T$ denotes true, $\perp$ denotes false, $A$ denotes a propositional letter, $\phi$ (possibly with a subscript) denotes a formula, $P$ denotes an atomic program, and $r$ (possibly with a subscript) denotes a program. PDL is obtained from CPDL by dropping converse programs $r^{-}$.

The semantics of propositional dynamic logics is based on Kripke structures,** which are defined as a triple $M=\left(\mathcal{S},\left\{\mathcal{R}_{P}\right\}, \Pi\right)$, where $\mathcal{S}$ denotes a non-empty set of states, $\left\{\mathcal{R}_{P}\right\}$ is a family of binary relations over $\mathcal{S}$ such that each atomic program $P$ is given a meaning through $\mathcal{R}_{P}$, and $\Pi$ is a mapping from $\mathcal{S}$ to propositional letters such that $\Pi(s)$ determines the letters that are true in the state $s$.

The basic semantical relation " $\phi$ holds at state $s$ of structure $M$ ", written $M, s \models \phi$, is defined by induction on the formation of $\phi$ as follows:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& M, s \models A \text { iff } A \in \operatorname{II}(s) \\
& M, s \models \top \text { always } \\
& M, s \models \perp \text { never } \\
& M, s \models \phi_{1} \wedge \phi_{2} \text { iff } M, s \models \phi_{1} \text { and } M, s \models \phi_{2} \\
& M, s \models \phi_{1} \vee \phi_{2} \text { iff } M, s \models \phi_{1} \text { or } M, s \models \phi_{2} \\
& M, s \models \phi_{1} \rightarrow \phi_{2} \text { iff } M, s \models \phi_{1} \text { implies } M, s \models \phi_{2} \\
& M, s \models \neg \phi \text { iff } M, s \not \models \phi \\
& M, s \models\langle r\rangle \phi \text { iff } \exists s^{\prime} .\left(s, s^{\prime}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{r} \text { and } M, s^{\prime} \models \phi \\
& M, s \models[r] \phi \text { iff } \forall s^{\prime} .\left(s, s^{\prime}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{r} \text { implies } M, s^{\prime} \models \phi
\end{aligned}
$$

[^2]where, for every program $r$, the relation $\mathcal{R}_{r}$ is defined by induction on the formation of $r$ as follows:
\[

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathcal{R}_{P} \subseteq \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{S} \\
& \mathcal{R}_{r_{1} \cup r_{2}}=\mathcal{R}_{r_{1}} \cup \mathcal{R}_{r_{2}} \quad \text { (seq. comp. of } \mathcal{R}_{r_{1}} \text { and } \mathcal{R}_{r_{2}} \text { ) } \\
& \left.\mathcal{R}_{R_{1} ; R_{2}}=\mathcal{R}_{r_{1}} \circ \mathcal{R}_{r_{2}} \quad \text { seq. closure of } \mathcal{R}_{r}\right) \\
& \mathcal{R}_{r^{*}}=\left(\mathcal{R}_{r}\right)^{*} \quad \text { (refl. trans. cos } \\
& \mathcal{R}_{r^{-}}=\left\{\left(s_{1}, s_{2}\right) \in \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{S} \mid\left(s_{2}, s_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{r}\right\} \\
& \mathcal{R}_{\phi ?}=\{(s, s) \in \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{S} \mid M, s \models \phi\}
\end{aligned}
$$
\]

A structure $M=\left(\mathcal{S},\left\{\mathcal{R}_{P}\right\}, \Pi\right)$ is called a model of a formula $\phi$ if there exists a state $s \in \mathcal{S}$ such that $M, s \models \phi$. A formula $\phi$ is satisfiable if there exists a model of $\phi$, unsatisfiable otherwise. A formula $\phi$ is valid in a structure $M$, written $M \models \phi$, if for all $s \in \mathcal{S}, M, s \models \phi$.

We call axioms, formulae that are assumed to be valid. Formally, a structure $M$ is a model of an axiom $\phi$, if $M \models \phi$. A structure $M$ is a model of a finite set of axioms $\Gamma$, written $M \models \Gamma$, if for all $\phi \in \Gamma$ we have $M \models \phi$. We say that a finite set $\Gamma$ of axioms logically implies a formula $\phi$, written $\Gamma \models \phi$, if for all $M$ such that $M \models \Gamma$ we have $M \models \phi$.

Observe that satisfiability of a formula $\phi$ can be reformulated in terms of logical implication simply as $\emptyset \not \models \neg \phi$. In turn a logical implication $\Gamma \vDash \phi$ can be reformulated in terms of satisfiability, by making use of the following result (Kozen and Tiuryn, 1990).

THEOREM 1. Let $\Gamma$ be a finite set of CPDL axioms, and $\phi$ a CPDL formula. Then $\Gamma \models \phi$ if and only if the CPDL formula

$$
\left[\left(P_{1} \cup \ldots \cup P_{m} \cup P_{1}^{-} \cup \ldots \cup P_{m}^{-}\right)^{*}\right] \Gamma^{\prime} \wedge \neg \phi
$$

is unsatisfiable, where $P_{1}, \ldots, P_{m}$ are all atomic programs occurring in $\Gamma \cup\{\phi\}$ and $\Gamma^{\prime}$ is the conjunction of all axioms in $\Gamma$.

A similar result holds for most propositional dynamic logics, including PDL. In particular, in $P D L$, the formula to check for unsatisfiability is $\left[\left(P_{1} \cup \ldots \cup P_{m}\right)^{*}\right] \Gamma^{\prime} \wedge$ $\neg \phi$. Observe that such a result exploits the power of program constructs (union, reflexive transitive closure) and the "connected model property"* of propositional dynamic logics in order to represent axioms (valid formulae).

In the sequel we assume $\vee,[\cdot]$ to be expressed by means of $\neg, \wedge,\langle \rangle\rangle$. We also assume, without loss of generality, that the converse operator is applied to atomic programs only. Indeed it is easy to check that any CPDL formula can be transformed in linear time in the size of the formula so that such an assumption is fulfilled, by making use of following equations: $\left(r_{1} ; r_{2}\right)^{-}=r_{2}^{-} ; r_{1}^{-},\left(r_{1} \cup r_{2}\right)^{-}=r_{1}^{-} \cup$ $r_{2}^{-},\left(r_{1}^{*}\right)^{-}=\left(r_{1}^{-}\right)^{*},(\phi ?)^{-}=\phi ?$.

[^3]The Fisher-Ladner closure (Fisher and Ladner, 1979) of a CPDL formula $\Phi$, denoted $C L(\Phi)$, is the least set $F$ such that $\Phi \in F$ and such that:

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\phi_{1} \wedge \phi_{2} \in F & \Rightarrow \phi_{1}, \phi_{2} \in F \\
\neg \phi \in F & \Rightarrow \phi \in F \\
\phi \in F & \Rightarrow \neg \phi \in F\left(\text { if } \phi \text { is not of the form } \neg \phi^{\prime}\right) \\
\langle r\rangle \phi \in F & \Rightarrow \phi \in F \\
\left\langle r_{1} ; r_{2}\right\rangle \phi \in F & \Rightarrow\left\langle r_{1}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi \in F \\
\left\langle r_{1} \cup r_{2}\right\rangle \phi \in F & \Rightarrow\left\langle r_{1}\right\rangle \phi,\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi \in F \\
\left\langle r^{*}\right\rangle \phi \in F & \Rightarrow\langle r\rangle\left\langle r^{*}\right\rangle \phi \in F \\
\left\langle\phi^{\prime} ?\right\rangle \phi \in F & \Rightarrow \phi^{\prime} \in F .
\end{array}
$$

Intuitively the notion of Fisher-Ladner closure of a formula is closely related to the notion of set of subformulae in other modal logics: given a formula $\Phi, C L(\Phi)$ includes all the formulae that play some role in establishing the truth-value of $\Phi$. Both the number and the size of the formulae in $C L(\Phi)$ are linearly bounded by the size of $\Phi$ (Fisher and Ladner, 1979). Note that, by definition, if $\phi \in C L(\Phi)$, then $C L(\phi) \subseteq C L(\Phi)$.

Let us denote the empty sequence of programs by the program $\varepsilon$, and define $\langle\varepsilon\rangle \phi \doteq \phi$ and $[\varepsilon] \phi \doteq \phi$. We call Post $(r)$ the set of programs defined by induction on the formation of $r$ as follows ( $a=P \mid P^{-}$):

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\operatorname{Post}(a) & =\{\varepsilon, a\} \\
\operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1} ; r_{2}\right) & =\left\{r_{1}^{\prime} ; r_{2} \mid r_{1}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1}\right)\right\} \cup \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{2}\right) \\
\operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1} \cup r_{2}\right) & =\operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1}\right) \cup \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{2}\right) \\
\operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1}^{*}\right) & =\left\{r_{1}^{\prime} ; r_{1}^{*} \mid r_{1}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1}\right)\right\} \\
\operatorname{Post}(\phi ?) & =\{\varepsilon, \phi ?\} .
\end{array}
$$

Intuitively, the set Post $(r)$ is formed by the programs that are (not necessarily proper) "postfix" of the program $r$. The following proposition holds.

PROPOSITION 2. Let $\langle r\rangle \phi$ be a formula. For all $r^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}(r),\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi \in C L(\langle r\rangle \phi)$.
Proof. By induction on the formation of $r$.
$-r=a$ or $r=\phi^{\prime}$. Then $\operatorname{Post}(r)=\{\varepsilon, r\}$. By definition, both $\phi \in C L(\langle r\rangle \phi)$ and $\langle r\rangle \phi \in C L(\langle r\rangle \phi)$.
$-r=r_{1} ; r_{2}$. Then Post $\left(r_{1} ; r_{2}\right)=\left\{r_{1}^{\prime} ; r_{2} \mid r_{1}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1}\right)\right\} \cup \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{2}\right)$.
Since $r_{1}$ is a subprogram of $r_{1} ; r_{2}$, by induction hypothesis, for all $r_{1}^{\prime} \in$ Post $\left(r_{1}\right)$ :

$$
\left\langle r_{1}^{\prime}\right\rangle\left(\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi\right) \in C L\left(\left\langle r_{1}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi\right) \subseteq C L\left(\left\langle r_{1} ; r_{2}\right\rangle \phi\right) .
$$

On the other hand, since $r_{2}$ is a subprogram of $r_{1} ; r_{2}$, by induction hypothesis, for all $r_{2}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{2}\right)$ :

$$
\left\langle r_{2}^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi \in C L\left(\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi\right) \subseteq C L\left(\left\langle r_{1} ; r_{2}\right\rangle \phi\right)
$$

$-r=r_{1} \cup r_{2}$. Then $\operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1} \cup r_{2}\right)=\operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1}\right) \cup \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{2}\right)$. By induction hypothesis, for $i=1,2$, for all $r_{i}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{i}\right)$ :
$\left\langle r_{i}^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi \in C L\left(\left\langle r_{i}\right\rangle \phi\right) \subseteq C L\left(\left\langle r_{1} \cup r_{2}\right\rangle \phi\right)$.
$-r=r_{1}^{*}$. Then $\operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1}^{*}\right)=\left\{r_{1}^{\prime} ; r_{1}^{*} \mid r_{1}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1}\right)\right\}$. By induction hypothesis, for all $r_{1}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1}\right)$ :

$$
\left\langle r_{1}^{\prime}\right\rangle\left(\left\langle r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi\right) \in C L\left(\left\langle r_{1}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi\right) \subseteq C L\left(\left\langle r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi\right)
$$

Finally, we introduce the notion of path. Intuitively a path describes the sequence of states a given run of a program goes through. ${ }^{\star}$ Formally, a path in a structure $M$ is a sequence $\left(s_{0}, \ldots, s_{q}\right)$ of states of $M(q \geq 0)$, such that for each $i=1, \ldots, q$, $\left(s_{i-1}, s_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{a}$ for some $a=P \mid P^{-}$. The length of $\left(s_{0}, \ldots, s_{q}\right)$ is $q$. We inductively define the set of paths $\operatorname{Path}_{M}(r)$ of a program $r$ in a structure $M$, as follows (the notation $r^{i}$ stands for $i$ repetitions of $r$-i.e., $r^{1}=r$, and $r^{i}=r ; r^{i-1}$ :

$$
\begin{aligned}
\operatorname{Path}_{M}(a)= & \mathcal{R}_{a}\left(a=P \mid P^{-}\right) \\
\text {Paths }_{M}\left(r_{1} \cup r_{2}\right)= & \operatorname{Path}_{M}\left(r_{1}\right) \cup \text { Paths }_{M}\left(r_{2}\right) \\
\text { Path }_{M}\left(r_{1} ; r_{2}\right)= & \left\{\left(s_{0}, \ldots, s_{u}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \mid\left(s_{0}, \ldots, s_{u}\right) \in \text { Paths }_{M}\left(r_{1}\right)\right. \\
& \text { and } \left.\left(s_{u}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in \text { Paths }_{M}\left(r_{2}\right)\right\} \\
\text { Path }_{M}\left(r^{*}\right)= & \{(s) \mid s \in \mathcal{S}\} \cup\left(\bigcup_{i>0} \text { Path }_{M}\left(r^{i}\right)\right) \\
\text { Path }_{M}\left(\phi^{\prime} ?\right)= & \left\{(s) \mid M, s \models \phi^{\prime}\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

The next two propositions describe the basic properties of paths. Proposition 3 concerns paths whose length is 0 : it says that if a formula $\langle r\rangle \phi$ is satisfied in a state $s$ by means of a path whose length is 0 , then there is a formula $\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ?\right\rangle \phi$, where the tests $\phi_{1} ?, \ldots, \phi_{g}$ ? occur in $r$, that is satisfied in $s$ and implies $\langle r\rangle \phi$.

PROPOSITION 3. Let $M$ be a structure and $\langle r\rangle \phi$ a formula, such that: $M, s \vDash\langle r\rangle \phi,(s) \in$ Paths $_{M}(r)$, and $M, s \vDash \phi$. Then there exists a formula $\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ?\right\rangle \phi$, with $g \geq 0$, such that:

- all tests $\phi_{i}$ ? occur in $r$;
$-M, s \models\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ?\right\rangle \phi ;$
$-\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ?\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\langle r\rangle \phi$ is valid.

[^4]Proof. By induction on the formation of $r$.
(1) $r=\phi^{\prime}$ ?

The thesis holds trivially.
(2) $r=r_{1} ; r_{2}$.
$M, s \models\left\langle r_{1} ; r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ and $(s) \in$ Path $_{M}(r)$ implies that $M, s \vDash\left\langle r_{1}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ and $(s) \in$ Paths ${ }_{M}\left(r_{1}\right)$ and $(s) \in \operatorname{Path}_{M}\left(r_{2}\right)$. By induction hypothesis, we can assume that:

- there is a formula $\left\langle\phi_{1,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{1, g_{1}} ?\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ such that all tests $\phi_{1, j}$ ? occur in $r_{1}$, $M, s \vDash\left\langle\phi_{1,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{1, g_{1}} ?\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$, and $\left\langle\phi_{1,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{1, g_{1}} ?\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{1}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ is valid;
- there is a formula $\left\langle\phi_{2,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{2, g_{2}} ?\right\rangle \phi$ such that all tests $\phi_{2, j}$ ? occur in $r_{2}$, $\left.M, s \models\left\langle\phi_{2,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{2, g_{1}}\right\rangle\right\rangle \phi$, and $\left.\left\langle\phi_{2,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{2, g_{2}}\right\rangle\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ is valid.
Hence, $\left\langle\phi_{1,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{1, g_{1}} ? ; \phi_{2,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{2, g_{2}} ?\right\rangle \phi$ is such that: (1) all tests $\phi_{i, j}$ ? occur in $r_{1}$ or $r_{2}$ and therefore in $r ;$ (2) $M, s \vDash\left\langle\phi_{1,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{1, g_{1}} ? ; \phi_{2,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{2, g_{2}} ?\right\rangle \phi$; (3) $\left\langle\phi_{1,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{1, g_{1}} ? ; \phi_{2,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{2, g_{2}} ?\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{1} ; r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ is valid.
(3) $r=r_{1} \cup r_{2}$.
$M, s \vDash\left\langle r_{1} \cup r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ implies that, either for $i=1$ or for $i=2, M, s \vDash\left\langle r_{i}\right\rangle \phi$ and $(s) \in$ Paths $_{M}\left(r_{i}\right)$. By induction hypothesis we can assume there is a formula $\left\langle\phi_{i, 1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{i, g_{i}} ?\right\rangle \phi$ such that all tests $\phi_{i, j}$ ? occur in $r_{i}, M, s \vDash\left\langle\phi_{i, 1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{i, g_{i}} ?\right\rangle \phi$, and $\left\langle\phi_{i, 1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{i, g_{i}} ?\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{i}\right\rangle \phi$ is valid. Therefore, considering that $\left\langle r_{i}\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow$ $\left\langle r_{1} \cup r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$, we get the thesis.
(4) $r=r_{1}^{*}$.

Since $(s) \in$ Paths $_{M}\left(r_{1}^{*}\right),\left\langle r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi$ is equivalent $\phi \vee\left\langle r_{1}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi$, and $M, s \models \phi$, the thesis holds trivially (with $g=0$ ).

Proposition 4 concerns paths whose length is greater than 0 : it says that if a formula $\langle r\rangle \phi$ is satisfied in a state $s$ by means of a path whose length greater than 0 , then there is a formula $\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ? ; a\right\rangle\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi$, where the tests $\phi_{1} ?, \ldots, \phi_{g}$ ? occur in $r, a$ is the first transition on the path, and $r^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}(r)$, which is satisfied in $s$ and implies $\langle r\rangle \phi$.

PROPOSITION 4. Let $M$ be a structure, and $\langle r\rangle \phi$ a formula such that: $M, s \models$ $\langle r\rangle \phi,\left(s=s_{0}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in$ Paths $_{M}(r)$ with $q>0$, and $M, s_{q} \models \phi$. Then there exists a formula $\left\langle\phi_{1} ?, \ldots ; \phi_{g} ? ; a\right\rangle\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi$, with $g \geq 0$, such that:

- all tests $\phi_{i}$ ? occur in $r$;
$-r^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}(r)$ (and hence $\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi \in C L(\langle r\rangle \phi)$ );
- $\left(s_{0}, s_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{a}$;
- $M, s_{1} \models\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi ;$
- $\left(s_{1}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in \operatorname{Path}_{M}\left(r^{\prime}\right)$;
$-\left\langle\phi_{1} ?, \ldots ; \phi_{g} ? ; a\right\rangle\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\langle r\rangle \phi$ is valid.
Proof. By induction on the formation of $r$.
(1) $r=a$.

The thesis holds trivially.
(2) $r=r_{1} ; r_{2}$.

Let $\left(s_{0}, \ldots, s_{i}\right)$ be the segment of $\left(s_{0}, \ldots, s_{q}\right)$ such that $\left(s_{0}, \ldots, s_{i}\right) \in \operatorname{Path}_{M}\left(r_{1}\right)$ and $\left(s_{i}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in$ Paths $_{M}\left(r_{2}\right)$. We consider two cases:
$-i>0$. Consider that: (1) $M, s_{0} \models\left\langle r_{1}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$ for $\phi^{\prime}=\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$; (2) $\left(s_{0}, \ldots, s_{i}\right) \in$ Path $s_{M}\left(r_{1}\right)$ with $i>0$; (3) $M, s_{i} \models\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$. By induction hypothesis, there is a formula $\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ? ; a\right\rangle\left\langle r_{1}^{\prime}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ such that:

- all tests $\phi_{i}$ ? occur in $r_{1}$, and hence in $r$;
- $r_{1}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1}\right)$, and hence $r_{1}^{\prime} ; r_{2} \in \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1} ; r_{2}\right)$;
- $\left(s_{0}, s_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{a}$;
- $M, s_{1} \models\left\langle r_{1}^{\prime}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$, and hence $M, s_{1} \models\left\langle r_{1}^{\prime} ; r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$;
- $\left(s_{1}, \ldots, s_{i}\right) \in$ Paths $_{M}\left(r_{1}^{\prime}\right)$ with $i \leq q$, and hence $\left(s_{1}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in$ Path $_{M}$ $\left(\left\langle r_{1}^{\prime} ; r_{2}\right\rangle \phi\right)$;
- $\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ? ; a\right\rangle\left\langle r_{1}^{\prime}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{1}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ is valid, and hence also the formula $\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ? ; a\right\rangle\left\langle r_{1}^{\prime} ; r_{2}\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{1} ; r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ is valid.
$-i=0$. By Proposition 3, there exists a formula $\left\langle\phi_{1,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{1, g_{1}} ?\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ such that
- all tests $\phi_{1, j}$ ? occur in $r_{1}$;
- $M, s_{0} \vDash\left\langle\phi_{1,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{1, g_{1}} ?\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$;
- $\left\langle\phi_{1,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{1, g_{1}} ?\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{1}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ is valid.

On the other hand, observe that $\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ is such that: (1) $M, s \models\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$; (2) $\left(s=s_{0}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in$ Path $_{M}\left(r_{2}\right)$ with $q>0$; (3) $M, s_{q} \vDash \phi$. Therefore, by induction hypothesis, there is a formula $\left\langle\phi_{2,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{2, g_{2}} ? ; a\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi$ such that - all tests $\phi_{2, j}$ ? occur in $r_{2}$;

- $r_{2}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{2}\right)\left(\subseteq \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1} ; r_{2}\right)\right)$;
- $\left(s_{0}, s_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{a}$;
- $M, s_{1} \models\left\langle r_{2}^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi$;
- $\left(s_{1}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in$ Paths $_{M}\left(r_{2}^{\prime}\right)$;
- $\left\langle\phi_{2,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{2, g_{2}} ? ; a\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ is valid.

Hence the formula $\left\langle\phi_{1,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{1, g_{1}} ? ; \phi_{2,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{2, g_{2}} ? ; a\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi$ is such that - all tests $\phi_{i, j}$ ? occur in either in $r_{1}$ or in $r_{2}$;

- $r_{2}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1} ; r_{2}\right)$;
- $\left(s_{0}, s_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{a}$;
- $M, s_{1} \models\left\langle r_{2}^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi$;
- $\left(s_{1}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in$ Paths $_{M}\left(r_{2}^{\prime}\right)$;
- $\left\langle\phi_{1,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{1, g_{1}} ?\right\rangle\left\langle\phi_{2,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{2, g_{2}} ? ; a\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{1}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ is valid, and hence also $\left\langle\phi_{1,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{1, g_{1}} ? ; \phi_{2,1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{2, g_{2}} ? ; a\right\rangle\left\langle r_{2}^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{1} ; r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ is valid.
(3) $r=r_{1} \cup r_{2}$.
$M, s \vDash\left\langle r_{1} \cup r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ with $\left(s=s_{0}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in \operatorname{Path}_{M}\left(r_{1} \cup r_{2}\right)$ implies that either for $i=1$ or $i=2$ : (1) $M, s \vDash\left\langle r_{i}\right\rangle \phi$; (2) $\left(s=s_{0}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in \operatorname{Path}_{M}\left(r_{i}\right)$ with $q>0$; (3) $M, s_{q} \models \phi$. Thus, by induction hypothesis, there is a formula $\left\langle\phi_{i, 1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{i, g_{1}} ? ; a_{i}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{i}^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi$ such that:
- all tests $\phi_{i, j}$ ? occur in $r_{i}$, and hence in $r_{1} \cup r_{2}$;
$-r_{i}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{i}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1} \cup r_{2}\right)$;
$-\left(s_{0}, s_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{a}$;
$-M, s_{1} \vDash\left\langle r_{i}^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi$;
$-\left(s_{1}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in$ Paths $_{M}\left(r_{i}^{\prime}\right)$;
$-\left\langle\phi_{i, 1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{i, g_{i}} ? ; a_{i}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{i}^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{i}\right\rangle \phi$ is valid, and therefore, considering that, $\left\langle r_{i}\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{1} \cup r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ is valid, we get that $\left\langle\phi_{i, 1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{i, g_{i}} ? ; a_{i}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{i}^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{1} \cup\right.$ $\left.r_{2}\right\rangle \phi$ is valid.
(4) $r=r_{1}^{*}$.

Since $q>0$, we have that $M, s \vDash\left\langle r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi$ implies $M, s \vDash\left\langle r_{1}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi$, and furthermore there is a segment $\left(s_{0}, \ldots, s_{i}\right)$ of $\left(s_{0}, \ldots, s_{q}\right)$ with $0<i \leq q$, such that $\left(s_{0}, \ldots, s_{i}\right) \in \operatorname{Paths}_{M}\left(r_{1}\right)$ and $\left(s_{i}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in$ Paths $_{M}\left(r_{1}^{*}\right)$. Thus we have: (1) $M, s_{0} \vDash\left\langle r_{1}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$ with $\phi^{\prime}=\left\langle r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi$; (2) $\left(s_{0}, \ldots, s_{i}\right) \in \operatorname{Path}_{M}\left(r_{1}\right)$ with $i>0$; (3) $M, s_{i} \vDash\left\langle r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi$. By induction hypothesis there exists a formula $\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ? ; a\right\rangle\left\langle r_{1}^{\prime}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi$ such that

- all tests $\phi_{i}$ ? occur in $r_{1}$, and hence in $r_{1}^{*}$;
$-r_{1}^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1}\right)$, and hence $r_{1}^{\prime} ; r_{1}^{*} \in \operatorname{Post}\left(r_{1}^{*}\right)$;
$-\left(s_{0}, s_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{a}$;
- $M, s_{1} \models\left\langle r_{1}^{\prime}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi$, and hence $M, s_{1} \models\left\langle r_{1}^{\prime} ; r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi$;
$-\left(s_{1}, \ldots, s_{i}\right) \in \operatorname{Path}_{M}\left(r_{1}^{\prime}\right)$, and hence $\left(s_{1}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in \operatorname{Path}_{M}\left(r_{1}^{\prime} ; r_{1}^{*}\right)$;
$-\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ? ; a\right\rangle\left\langle r_{1}^{\prime}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{1}\right\rangle\left\langle r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi$ is valid, hence also the formula $\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ? ; a\right\rangle\left\langle r_{1}^{\prime} ; r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{1} ; r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi$ is valid. Therefore, considering that $\left\langle r_{1} ; r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi$, we get that $\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ? ; a\right\rangle\left\langle r_{1}^{\prime} ; r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi \rightarrow\left\langle r_{1}^{*}\right\rangle \phi$ is valid.


## 3. The Encoding

We now show the encoding of $C P D L$ formulae into $P D L$. More precisely, we exhibit a mapping $\gamma$ from CPDL formulae to $P D L$ formulae such that, for any $C P D L$ formula $\Phi, \Phi$ is satisfiable if and only if $\gamma(\Phi)$ is satisfiable. The formula $\gamma(\Phi)$, whose size is polynomial with respect to the size of $\Phi$, is said to be the $P D L$-counterpart of $\Phi$. We assume without loss of generality that in $\Phi$ the converse operator is applied to atomic programs only.

DEFINITION. Let $\Phi$ be a CPDL formula with the converse operator applied to atomic programs only. We define the $P D L$-counterpart $\gamma(\Phi)$ of $\Phi$ as the conjunction of two formulae, $\gamma(\Phi)=\gamma_{1}(\Phi) \wedge \gamma_{2}(\Phi)$, where:
$-\gamma_{1}(\Phi)$ is obtained from the original formula $\Phi$ by replacing each occurrence of $P^{-}$with a new atomic program $P^{c}$, for all atomic programs $P$ occurring in $\Phi$.
$-\gamma_{2}(\Phi)=\left[\left(P_{1} \cup \ldots \cup P_{m} \cup P_{1}^{c} \cup \ldots \cup P_{m}^{c}\right)^{*}\right] \gamma_{2}^{1} \wedge \ldots \wedge \gamma_{2}^{g}$, where $P_{1}, \ldots, P_{m}$ are all atomic programs appearing in $\Phi$, and with a conjunct $\gamma_{2}^{i}$ of the form

$$
\left(\phi \rightarrow[P]\left\langle P^{c}\right\rangle \phi\right) \wedge\left(\phi \rightarrow\left[P^{c}\right]\langle P\rangle \phi\right)
$$

for every $\phi \in C L\left(\gamma_{1}(\Phi)\right)$ and $P \in\left\{P_{1}, \ldots, P_{m}\right\}$.
THEOREM 5. Let $\Phi$ be a CPDL formula, and $\gamma(\Phi)$ its PDL-counterpart. Then $\gamma(\Phi)$ is a PDL formula, and its size is polynomially related to the size of $\Phi$.

Proof. $\gamma(\Phi)$ is obviously a PDL formula. Furthermore, since both the number and the size of the formulae in $C L\left(\gamma_{1}(\Phi)\right)$ are bounded by the size $\left|\gamma_{1}(\Phi)\right|$ of $\gamma_{1}(\Phi)$, and $\left|\gamma_{1}(\Phi)\right|=|\Phi|$, it follows that $|\gamma(\Phi)|=O(m \cdot|\Phi| \cdot|\Phi|)$, where $m$ is the number of atomic programs occurring in $\Phi$.

Note that, although the size of $\gamma(\Phi)$ is $O(m \cdot|\Phi| \cdot|\Phi|)$, the special form of $\gamma(\Phi)$ guarantees that $|C L(\gamma(\Phi))|=O(m \cdot|C L(\Phi)|)$, i.e. the size of the Fisher-Ladner closure of $\gamma(\Phi)$ is essentially the same as that of $\Phi$ multiplied by the number of atomic programs in $\Phi$. This observation is of significant practical interest since the efficiency of several inference procedures for PDL depends, in fact, on the size of the Fisher-Lander closure of the formula, and only indirectly on the size of the formula.

The purpose of $\gamma_{1}(\Phi)$ is to eliminate the converse of atomic programs (the only converse programs) from $\Phi$ and replace them with new atomic programs. Each new atomic program $P^{c}$ is intended to represent $P^{-}$(the converse of the atomic program $P$ ) in $\gamma_{1}(\Phi)$.

The purpose of $\gamma_{2}(\Phi)$ is to constrain the models $M$ of $\gamma(\Phi)$ so that, for all $\phi \in C L\left(\gamma_{1}(\Phi)\right)$, for all states $s$ of $M$, if $\phi$ holds in $s$ then all the $P$-successors of $s$ have a $P^{c}$-successor where $\phi$ holds, and similarly all the $P^{c}$-successors of $s$ have a $P$-successor where $\phi$ holds. We shall show that, as far as satisfiability (but also validity and logical implication) is concerned, this allows us to faithfully represent the converse of $P$ by means of $P^{c}$.

First of all, observe that if instead of $\gamma_{2}(\Phi)$ we imposed, for each $P$, the two axiom schemata ( $\phi$ any formula):

$$
\begin{aligned}
\phi & \rightarrow[P]\left\langle P^{c}\right\rangle \phi \\
\phi & \rightarrow\left[P^{c}\right]\langle P\rangle \phi
\end{aligned}
$$

then the models of $\gamma_{1}(\Phi)$ would be isomorphic to the models of $\Phi$. In fact, the above axiom schemata are identical to the ones used in the axiomatization of CPDL to force the program $P^{-}$to be the converse of $P$. However the resulting logic would not be $P D L$ but trivially $C P D L$.

Instead, $\gamma_{2}(\Phi)$ can be thought as a finite instantiation of the above two axiom schemata: one instance for each formula in $C L(\Phi) .^{\star}$ Although imposing the validity of such a finite instantiation does not suffice to guarantee the isomorphism of

[^5]the models of $\gamma_{1}(\Phi)$ and $\Phi$, we show that it suffices to guarantee that $\gamma_{1}(\Phi)$ has a model if and only if $\Phi$ has a model.

It is a standard result that if a CPDL formula $\Phi$ has a model, then it has a connected model, where a model $M=\left(\mathcal{S},\left\{\mathcal{R}_{P}\right\}, \Pi\right)$ of $\Phi$ is a connected model, if for some $s s \in \mathcal{S}$ :
$-M, s s \models \Phi$;
$-\mathcal{S}=\left\{t \mid(s s, t) \in\left(\bigcup_{P} \mathcal{R}_{P} \cup \mathcal{R}_{P^{-}}\right)^{*}\right\}$.
Let $\Phi$ be either a $C P D L$ formula or a $P D L$ formula. We call a structure $M=$ $\left(\mathcal{S},\left\{\mathcal{R}_{P}\right\}, \Pi\right)$ a structure of $\Phi$, if every atomic program $P$ and every atomic proposition $A$ occurring in $\Phi$ is interpreted in $M$, i.e. $\mathcal{R}_{P}$ appears in $M$, and $A$ appears in the co-domain of $\Pi$.

In the following we use $\pi$ as an abstraction for both $P$ and $P^{c}$. Moreover, $\pi^{c}$ denotes $P^{c}$, if $\pi=P$, and it denotes $P$, if $\pi=P^{c}$.

Let $M=\left(\mathcal{S},\left\{\mathcal{R}_{\pi}\right\}, \Pi\right)$ be a connected model of $\gamma(\Phi)$. We call the $c$-closure of $M$, the structure $M^{\prime}=\left(\mathcal{S}^{\prime},\left\{\mathcal{R}_{\pi}^{\prime}\right\}, \Pi^{\prime}\right)$ of $\gamma(\Phi)$, defined as follows:
$-\mathcal{S}^{\prime}=\mathcal{S}$;
$-\mathcal{R}_{\pi}^{\prime}=\mathcal{R}_{\pi} \cup\left\{(t, s) \mid(s, t) \in \mathcal{R}_{\pi^{c}}\right\}$, for each atomic program $\pi$ in $\gamma(\Phi) ;$
$-\Pi^{\prime}=\Pi$.
Note that in the c-closure $M^{\prime}$ of a model $M$, each $\mathcal{R}_{P}^{\prime}$ of $M^{\prime}$ is obtained from $\mathcal{R}_{P}$ of $M$ by including, for each pair $(s, t)$ in $\mathcal{R}_{P^{c}}$, the pair $(t, s)$ in $\mathcal{R}_{P}^{\prime}$, and similarly each $\mathcal{R}_{P^{c}}^{\prime}$ is obtained from $R_{P c}$ by including, for each pair $(s, t)$ in $R_{P}$, the pair $(t, s)$ in $\mathcal{R}_{P^{c}}^{\prime}$. As a result in the c-closure of a model each atomic program $P^{c}$ is interpreted as the converse of $P$.

The next lemma is the core of the results in this paper. Intuitively it says that the c-closure of a connected model is equivalent to the original model with respect to the formulae in $C L\left(\gamma_{1}(\Phi)\right)$.

LEMMA 6. Let $M=\left(\mathcal{S},\left\{\mathcal{R}_{P}\right\}, \Pi\right)$ be a connected model of $\gamma(\Phi)$, and $M^{\prime}=$ $\left(\mathcal{S}^{\prime},\left\{\mathcal{R}_{P}^{\prime}\right\}, \Pi^{\prime}\right)$ its $c$-closure. Then, for every $s \in \mathcal{S}\left(=\mathcal{S}^{\prime}\right)$, and every $\phi \in$ $C L\left(\gamma_{1}(\Phi)\right):$

$$
M, s \models \phi \text { iff } M^{\prime}, s \models \phi
$$

Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the formation of $\phi$ (called formula induction in the following).
$-\phi=A . M, s \vDash A$ iff $A \in \Pi(s)$ iff, by construction of $M^{\prime}, A \in \Pi^{\prime}(s)$ iff $M^{\prime}, s \models A$.
$-\phi=\neg \phi^{\prime} . M, s \models \neg \phi^{\prime}$ iff $M, s \not \vDash \phi^{\prime}$ iff, by the formula induction hypothesis, $M^{\prime}, s \not \models \phi^{\prime}$ iff $M^{\prime}, s \models \neg \phi^{\prime}$.
$-\phi=\phi_{1} \wedge \phi_{2} . M, s \models \phi_{1} \wedge \phi_{2}$ iff $M, s \models \phi_{1}$ and $M, s \models \phi_{2}$ iff, by the formula induction hypothesis, $M^{\prime}, s \models \phi_{1}$ and $M^{\prime}, s \models \phi_{2}$ iff $M^{\prime}, s \models \phi_{1} \wedge \phi_{2}$.
$-\phi=\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime} . \Rightarrow . M, s \vDash\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$ iff there is a path $\left(s=s_{0}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in$ Paths $_{M}(r)$
such that $M, s_{q} \models \phi^{\prime}$. We show that $M^{\prime}, s \models\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$, by induction on the length of the path (called path induction in the following).
$q=0$. In this case $\left(s=s_{0}\right) \in \operatorname{Path}_{M}(r)$ and $M, s \vDash \phi^{\prime}$. Then, by Proposition 3 , there exists a formula $\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ?\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$ such that:

- all tests $\phi_{i}$ ? occur in $r$, and hence all $\phi_{i}$ are subformulae of $\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$;
- $M, s \vDash\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ?\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$;
- $\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ?\right\rangle \phi^{\prime} \rightarrow\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$ is valid.

By the formula induction hypothesis, for every $\phi_{x} \in\left\{\phi_{1}, \ldots, \phi_{g}, \phi^{\prime}\right\}$, we have that $M, s \vDash \phi_{x}$ iff $M^{\prime}, s \vDash \phi_{x}$. Hence, since a formula of the form $\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ?\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$ is equivalent to $\phi_{1} \wedge \ldots \wedge \phi_{g} \wedge \phi^{\prime}$, we conclude that $M^{\prime}, s \models$ $\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$.
$q>0$. In this case, by Proposition 4, there exists a formula $\left\langle\phi_{1}\right.$ ?; ...; $\left.\phi_{g} ? ; \pi\right\rangle\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$ such that:

- all tests $\phi_{i}$ ? occur in $r$, and hence all $\phi_{i}$ are subformulae of $\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$;
- $r^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Post}(r)$, and hence $\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime} \in C L\left(\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}\right) \subseteq C L\left(\gamma_{1}(\Phi)\right)$;
- $\left(s_{0}, s_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{\pi}$;
- $M, s_{1} \models\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$;
- $\left(s_{1}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in$ Paths $_{M}\left(r^{\prime}\right)$;
- $\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ? ; \pi\right\rangle\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime} \rightarrow\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$ is valid.

By the formula induction hypothesis, for every $\phi_{x} \in\left\{\phi_{1}, \ldots, \phi_{g}\right\}$, we have $M, s_{0} \models \phi_{x}$ iff $M^{\prime}, s_{0} \models \phi_{x}$.
By construction of $M^{\prime},\left(s_{0}, s_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{\pi}$ implies $\left(s_{0}, s_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{\pi}^{\prime}$.
Considering that $\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime} \in C L\left(\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}\right) \subseteq C L\left(\gamma_{1}(\Phi)\right)$, by the path induction hypothesis, $M, s_{1} \models\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$ and $\left(s_{1}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in \operatorname{Path}_{M}\left(r^{\prime}\right)$ implies $M^{\prime}, s_{1} \models$ $\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$.
Hence $M^{\prime}, s_{0} \models\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$.
$\Leftarrow M^{\prime}, s \models\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$ iff there is a path $\left(s=s_{0}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in$ Paths $_{M^{\prime}}(r)$ such that $M^{\prime}, s_{q} \vDash \phi^{\prime}$. We prove that $M, s \vDash\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$, by induction on the length of the path (called path induction in the following).
$q=0$. In this case $\left(s=s_{0}\right) \in \operatorname{Path}_{M^{\prime}}(r)$ and $M^{\prime}, s \vDash \phi^{\prime}$. Then, by Proposition 3, there exists a formula $\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ?\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$ such that:

- all tests $\phi_{i}$ ? occur in $r$, and hence all $\phi_{i}$ are subformulae of $\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$;
- $M^{\prime}, s \vDash\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ?\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$;
$-\left\langle\phi_{1} ?, \ldots ; \phi_{g} ?\right\rangle \phi^{\prime} \rightarrow\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$ is valid.
By the formula induction hypothesis, for every $\phi_{x} \in\left\{\phi_{1}, \ldots, \phi_{g}, \phi^{\prime}\right\}$, we have that $M^{\prime}, s \models \phi_{x}$ iff $M, s \models \phi_{x}$. Hence $M, s \models\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$.
$q>0$. In this case, by Proposition 4, there exists a formula $\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ? ; \pi\right\rangle\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$ such that:
- all tests $\phi_{i}$ ? occur in $r$, and hence all $\phi_{i}$ are subformulae of $\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$;
- $r \in \operatorname{Post}(r)$, and hence $\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime} \in C L\left(\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}\right) \subseteq C L\left(\gamma_{1}(\Phi)\right)$;
- $\left(s_{0}, s_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{\pi}^{\prime}$;
- $M^{\prime}, s_{1} \vDash\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$;
- $\left(s_{1}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in \operatorname{Path}_{M^{\prime}}\left(r^{\prime}\right)$;
- $\left\langle\phi_{1} ? ; \ldots ; \phi_{g} ? ; \pi\right\rangle\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime} \rightarrow\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$ is valid.

By the formula induction hypothesis, for every $\phi_{x} \in\left\{\phi_{1}, \ldots, \phi_{g}\right\}$, we have $M^{\prime}, s_{0} \models \phi_{x}$ iff $M, s_{0} \models \phi_{x}$.
Considering that $\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime} \in C L\left(\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}\right) \subseteq C L\left(\gamma_{1}(\Phi)\right)$, by the path induction hypothesis, $M^{\prime}, s_{1} \models\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$ and $\left(s_{1}, \ldots, s_{q}\right) \in$ Paths $_{M^{\prime}}\left(r^{\prime}\right)$ implies $M, s_{1} \models$ $\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$.
Since $\left(s_{0}, s_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{\pi}^{\prime}$, by construction of $M^{\prime}$, we have that either $\left(s_{0}, s_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{\pi}$, or $\left(s_{0}, s_{1}\right) \notin \mathcal{R}_{\pi}$ and $\left(s_{1}, s_{0}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{\pi}$.

- If $\left(s_{0}, s_{1}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{\pi}$, then we can immediately conclude that $M, s_{0} \models\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$.
- If $\left(s_{0}, s_{1}\right) \notin \mathcal{R}_{\pi}$ and $\left(s_{1}, s_{0}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{\pi^{c}}$, then considering that $\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$ is equivalent to a formula $\psi \in C L\left(\gamma_{1}(\Phi)\right)$, by $\gamma_{2}(\Phi)$ we have that

$$
M, s_{1} \models\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime} \rightarrow\left[\pi^{c}\right]\langle\pi\rangle\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime} .
$$

Thus there exists a state $s_{1}^{\prime} \in \mathcal{S}$ (different from $s_{1}$ ) such that $\left(s_{0}, s_{1}^{\prime}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{\pi}$ and $M, s_{1}^{\prime} \models\left\langle r^{\prime}\right\rangle \phi^{\prime}$. Hence, also in this case, we can conclude that $M, s_{0} \models$ $\langle r\rangle \phi^{\prime}$.

The previous lemma has the following consequence.
LEMMA 7. Let $M$ be a connected model of $\gamma(\Phi)$ and $M^{\prime}$ its $c$-closure. Then $M^{\prime}$ is a model of $\gamma(\Phi)$ as well.

Proof. Let $M=\left(\mathcal{S},\left\{\mathcal{R}_{\pi}\right\}, \Pi\right)$ and $M^{\prime}=\left(\mathcal{S}^{\prime},\left\{\mathcal{R}_{\pi}^{\prime}\right\}, \Pi^{\prime}\right)$. By Lemma 6, for all $s \in S=S^{\prime}$ and all $\phi \in C L\left(\gamma_{1}(\Phi)\right):$

$$
M, s \models \phi \text { iff } M^{\prime}, s \models \phi .
$$

Furthermore, by definition of $M^{\prime},\left(s, s^{\prime}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{\pi}^{\prime}$ implies $\left(s^{\prime}, s\right) \in \mathcal{R}_{\pi^{c}}^{\prime}$. Thus, for all $s \in \mathcal{S}^{\prime}$ and all $\phi \in C L\left(\gamma_{1}(\Phi)\right)$ :

$$
\begin{gathered}
M^{\prime}, s \vDash \phi \rightarrow[P]\left\langle P^{c}\right\rangle \phi \\
M^{\prime}, s \models \phi \rightarrow\left[P^{c}\right]\langle P\rangle \phi .
\end{gathered}
$$

Hence we can conclude that the thesis holds.
Below we formulate the main result of the present work.
THEOREM 8. A CPDL formula $\Phi$ is satisfiable iff its PDL-counterpart $\gamma(\Phi)$ is satisfiable.

Proof. $\Rightarrow$. Let $M^{C P D L}=\left(\mathcal{S}^{C P D L},\left\{\mathcal{R}_{P}^{C P D L}\right\}, \Pi^{C P D L}\right)$ be a model of $\Phi$. We define a structure $M^{P D L}=\left(\mathcal{S}^{P D L},\left\{\mathcal{R}_{\pi}^{P D L}\right\}, \Pi^{P D L}\right)$ of $\gamma(\Phi)$ as follows:
$-\mathcal{S}^{P D L}=\mathcal{S}^{C P D L}$;
$-\mathcal{R}_{P}^{P D L}=\mathcal{R}_{P}^{C P D L}$ and $\mathcal{R}_{P \mathrm{c}}^{P D L}=\left\{(t, s) \mid(s, t) \in \mathcal{R}_{P}^{C P D L}\right\}$, for all atomic programs $P$ occurring in $\Phi$;
$-\Pi^{P D L}=\Pi^{C P D L}$.
It is easy to verify that $M^{P} D L$ is a model of $\gamma(\Phi)$.
$\Leftarrow$. Let $M^{P D L}=\left(\mathcal{S}^{P D L},\left\{\mathcal{R}_{\pi}^{P D L}\right\}, \Pi^{P D L}\right)$ be a connected model of $\gamma(\Phi)$ and $M^{P D L^{\prime}}=\left(\mathcal{S}^{P D L^{\prime}},\left\{\mathcal{R}_{\pi}^{P D L^{\prime}}\right\}, \Pi^{P D L^{\prime}}\right)$ its c-closure. By Lemma 7, $M^{\prime}$ is a model of $\gamma(\Phi)$ as well.

Observe that, by definition, $M^{\prime}$ is such that, for each atomic program $\pi, \mathcal{R}_{\pi^{c}}^{P D L^{\prime}}=$ $\left(\mathcal{R}_{\pi}^{P D L^{\prime}}\right)^{-}$. We define a structure $M^{C P D L}=\left(\mathcal{S}^{C P D L},\left\{\mathcal{R}_{P}^{C P D L}\right\}, \Pi^{C P D L}\right)$ of $\gamma(\Phi)$ as follows:
$-\mathcal{S}^{C P D L}=\mathcal{S}^{P D L^{\prime}} ;$
$-\mathcal{R}_{P}^{C P D L}=\mathcal{R}_{P}^{P D L^{\prime}}$ for all atomic programs $P$ occurring in $\Phi$;
$-\Pi^{C P D L}=\Pi^{P D L^{\prime}}$.
It is easy to verify that $M^{C P D L}$ is a model of $\Phi$.

## 4. Conclusion

The logics $P D L$ and $C P D L$ share many characteristics, and many of the results for $P D L$ extend to CPDL without difficulty. For instance the proofs of finite model property and decidability for PDL in (Fisher and Ladner, 1979) are easily extended to CPDL, as well as the proof of EXPTIME-completeness of satisfiability in (Pratt, 1979). However, while efficient - in practical cases - inference procedures have been successfully developed for $P D L$, extending them to $C P D L$ has proved to be a difficult task, and to the best of our knowledge had been unsuccessful till now.

To be more precise, the inference procedures for $P D L$ based on the enumeration of models such as those in (Fisher and Ladner, 1979; Pratt, 1979) can be easily modified to accommodate converse programs. But these procedures are better suited for proving theoretical results than for use in practice, since they are inherently exponential, not only in the worst-case.

In contrast, inference procedures for PDL such as those in (Pratt, 1978; Pratt, 1980), based on tableaux methods, which are much more efficient in practical cases, are difficult to modify to cope with converse programs.

The difficulty can be intuitively grasped by observing how these procedures attempt to build a model of a $P D L$ formula in order to check its satisfiability. They start by introducing an initial state, and try to make it satisfy the formula. At first, reasoning is carried out locally, i.e. considering subformulae that involve state transitions, simply as atomic propositions. Next, when no more local reasoning is possible, the successor states, introduced by atomic programs, are generated, and
the relevant formulae that these states ought to satisfy are propagated. For each successor state the two steps above are recursively repeated until certain termination conditions are met. The key point is that once the successors of a given state have been generated, there will be no more reasoning involving that state carried out. Thus, to check satisfiability of a PDL formula, a tableaux based procedure can be organized so as to work only "forward". This feature turns out to be essential in order to ensure efficient termination criteria.

The presence of converse programs does not allow us to extend the above approach in an obvious way. Indeed, reasoning on a state cannot be completely carried out without generating its successors, because, through converse programs, some successors may require further properties to be satisfied by the original state. Therefore, to check satisfiability of a CPDL formula, a procedure has to work both "forward" and "backward", thus losing efficiency, since at any point reasoning may involve all of the model built so far.

Is there any way out of this problem? One possible solution is by trying to single out a (hopefully small) set of additional formulae to be checked in every state, that in some sense anticipates the properties successor states may require at a later stage of the computation.

What the encoding of $C P D L$ into $P D L$ presented in this paper does is single out exactly a set of additional formulae as that mentioned above. Hence it can be the basis to develop better reasoning procedure for CPDL, on top of inference procedures for $P D L$. In fact, the encoding allows us to build a satisfiability procedure for $C P D L$ by simply translating a $C P D L$ formula to a $P D L$ formula and then running a $P D L$ satisfiability procedure on it. Therefore, considering that the encoding is polynomial, by employing an efficient satisfiability procedure for $P D L$ we get an efficient satisfiability procedure for $C P D L$.

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[^0]:    * There are uses of propositional dynamic logics where the ability of denoting converse programs is essential. For example, when propositional dynamic logics are applied in the context of knowledge representation formalisms based on classes and links, converse programs are necessary in order to navigate links in both directions (De Giacomo and Lenzerini, 1994; De Giacomo and Lenzerini, 1995; De Giacomo, 1995).

[^1]:    * That is, the truth-value of each formula in the set depends only on the truth-value of formulae already in the set.

[^2]:    * For surveys on propositional dynamic logics, see (Harel, 1984; Kozen and Tiuryn, 1990) and also (Stirlink 1992).
    ** Also called "transition systems".

[^3]:    * That is, if a formula has a model, it has a model which is connected (see below).

[^4]:    * The notion of path used here has the same role as the one of trajectory used in (Ben-Ari et al., 1982), and that of execution sequence in (Streett, 1982). However, the technical details of the various notions differ. In order to make the paper complete and self-contained, we are going to give full-fledged proofs of the basic properties of paths.

[^5]:    * Actually, $\gamma_{2}(\Phi)$ already takes into account the reduction from logical implication to satisfiability of Theorem 1.

