

Using Qubits to Quack the Uncrackable

VNU CVN GNL OCH

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Cryptology

SKBVL FVLVE LJIXQ

Cipher Text

Caesar shift ±3:

↓ ↓ ↓

DECRYPT

physi_cs|sib_igfun

Plain Text

Substitution:

↓ ↓ ↓

ENCRYPT

YGFWC PWCWT CRSXH

Cipher Text '

Encryption/Decryption:

±3

Key

{..., h ⇔ G, ..., p ⇔ Y, ...}

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z

↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ENCRYPTION ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓

D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C

↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ DECRYPTION ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z

TJPNX WJNBZ OCPTJ GNUCZ LCWWZ XHDCE JZLVC HNLFJ
 MYJLC JHPJC BCWUJ LFVCS SCPXD BBZRJ BXWJV BZNHV
 CBNYY JNLWY JPXDC NLNVH OFWBJ LCZXW BZJUJ LFZHJ
 TZBGB ZBGJH ZUCPJ NHVBZ BGJJM YJLCJ HPJVY GFWCP
 CWBJU JHBGJ JMYJL BWVZH ZBXHV JLWBN HVCBB GJINF
 BGJFI ZXDVD CEJBZ NHVCB CWYJL SJPBD FLJNW ZHNTD
 JBGNB BGJFW GZXDV HZBTJ PNXWJ NDDZS VCLJP BGXON
 HJMYJ LCJHP JNHVZ SGXON HCHBX CBCZH NYVDC JWBZD
 NLRJZ TAJPB WIJEH ZIGZI DNLRJ ZTAJP BWICD DNPBT
 XBBGC HRWZH NWOND DWPND JAXWB VZHXB NPBBG NBINF
 WZIJG NUJBZ DJNLH NTZXB BGJOC HNWZL BZSNT WBLNP
 BZLCO NRCHN BCUJS NWGCZ HNHVH ZBTFP ZHHJP BCZHI
 CBGZX LVCLJ PBJMY JLCJH PJLYS

↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓

Frequency count:

e	t	a	↔	o	i	n	s	...
J-63	B-54	Z-42		N-41	C-38	H-36	W-27	
L-25	P-22	G-20		D-19	V-18	X-17	Y-12	
T-11	F-11	I- 9		U- 7	S- 7	O- 7	R- 5	
M- 5	Q- 3	E- 3		A- 3	K- 0			

↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓

TePaX seato OiPTe GaUio Lisso XnDiE eoLVi naLFe
MYeLi enPei tisUe LFViS SiPXD ttoRe tXseV toanV
itaYY eaLsY ePXDi aLanV OFste LioXs toeUe LFone
TotGt otGen oUiPe anVto tGeeM YeLie nPeVY GFsiP
isteU entGe eMYeL tsVon otXnV eLsta nVitt GeIaF
tGeFI oXDVD iEeto anVit isYeL SePtD FLeas onaTD
etGat tGeFs GoXDv notTe PaXse aDDoS ViLeP tGXoA
neMYe LienP eanVo SGXoA nintX ition aYYDi estoD
aLReo TAePt sIeEn oIGoI DaLRe oTAeP tsIiD DaPtT
XttGi nRson asOaD DsPaD eAXst Vonot aPttG atIaF
soIeG aUeto DeaLn aToXt tGe0i nasoL toSaT stLaP
toLiO aRina tiUeS asGio nanVn otTFP onneP tionI
itGoX LViLe PteMY eLien PeLYS

↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓

Monoalphabetic substitution:

N	T	P	V	J	S	R	G	C	A	E	D	O	H	Z	Y	K	L	W	B	X	U	I	M	F	Q	
↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔	↔
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	


because atomic behavior is so unlike ordinary experience, it is very difficult to get used to, and it appears peculiar and mysterious to everyone—both to the novice and to the experienced physicist. Even the experts do not understand it the way they would like to, and it is perfectly reasonable that they should not, because all of direct, human experience and of human intuition applies to large objects. We know how large objects will act, but things on a small scale just do not act that way. So we have to learn about them in a sort of abstract or imaginative fashion and not by connection with our direct experience.

—Richard P. Feynman, *The Feynman Lectures*, vol. 3, p. 1–1

Public en/decryption algorithm *vs.* *Private* symmetric key

Steganography — just *hide* the message!

One-Time Pads — TRULY SECURE ... if indeed *onetime*



Simple Shifts, Substitutions —

- Caesar shifts HFJXFW XMNKYX
 - Monoalphabetic **substitutions** WXTWBCBXBCZHW
 - Ciphers ☰☒☒☒☐☐ ☱————

Keyed Transpositions &/or Substitutions —

Key	a	b	c	d	...
A= 1	A	B	C	D	...
T=20	T	U	V	W	...
O= 9	O	P	Q	R	...
M=14	M	N	O	P	...
.
.
.

- Vigenère Square (*Le Chiffre Indéchiffrable*)
 - Playfair Cipher (**SH MV CM KQ**), &c.

Substitutions + Transpositions \Rightarrow Hyper-Scrambling —

||| Key Distribution Problem !!!

Modular Arithmetic₁—A “Natural” Scrambler

Modular Arithmetic — A One-Way Function (in effect)

prime p

$$\begin{array}{l}
 \downarrow \\
 \left. \begin{array}{ll}
 3^0 \bmod 7 = 1 \bmod 7 = 1 & \\
 3^1 \bmod 7 = 3 \bmod 7 = 3 & \\
 3^2 \bmod 7 = 9 \bmod 7 = 2 & \\
 3^3 \bmod 7 = 6 \bmod 7 = 6 & \\
 3^4 \bmod 7 = 18 \bmod 7 = 4 & \\
 3^5 \bmod 7 = 12 \bmod 7 = 5 & \\
 3^6 \bmod 7 = 15 \bmod 7 = 1 & \\
 3^7 \bmod 7 = 3 \bmod 7 = 3 & \\
 \vdots & \\
 3^{6x+1} \bmod 7 = 3 \bmod 7 = 3 & \\
 \end{array} \right\} = 1 \text{ period} = p - 1 (= 6) \text{ factors} \\
 \boxed{\vdots} \quad \boxed{\quad} \\
 \boxed{?}
 \end{array}$$

$\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6\}$ form a group
under “multiplication mod[ulo] 7”

N.B. $7 \bmod 7 = 0$
 $\mu^{p-1} \bmod p = 1$
 $\mu^p \bmod p = \mu$
 (“Fermat’s Little Theorem”)

It would take $\sim \mathcal{O}(p - 1) \sim \mathcal{O}(6)$ attempts
to extract the exponent from the remainder.

All periods mod[ulo] 7:

$$\underbrace{\begin{array}{cccccccccc}
 1^0 = 1 & 1^1 = 1 & 1^2 = 1 & 1^3 = 1 & 1^4 = 1 & 1^5 = 1 & 1^6 = 1 & 1^7 = 1 \\
 2^0 = 1 & 2^1 = 2 & 2^2 = 4 & 2^3 = 1 & 2^4 = 2 & 2^5 = 4 & 2^6 = 1 & 2^7 = 2 \\
 3^0 = 1 & 3^1 = 3 & 3^2 = 2 & 3^3 = 6 & 3^4 = 4 & 3^5 = 5 & 3^6 = 1 & 3^7 = 3 \\
 4^0 = 1 & 4^1 = 4 & 4^2 = 2 & 4^3 = 1 & 4^4 = 4 & 4^5 = 2 & 4^6 = 1 & 4^7 = 4 \\
 5^0 = 1 & 5^1 = 5 & 5^2 = 4 & 5^3 = 6 & 5^4 = 2 & 5^5 = 3 & 5^6 = 1 & 5^7 = 5 \\
 6^0 = 1 & 6^1 = 6 & 6^2 = 1 & 6^3 = 6 & 6^4 = 1 & 6^5 = 6 & 6^6 = 1 & 6^7 = 6
 \end{array}}_{p - 1 (= 6) \text{ factors} \geq 1 \text{ period}}$$

$\{\text{anything}\}^{6x+1} \bmod 7 = \{\text{anything}\}$

Modular Arithmetic₂—A “Natural” Scrambler

Modular Arithmetic — A One-Way Function (in effect)

<i>prime p</i>	↓	
909556943^0		$\mod 827293847003885557 = 1$
909556943^1		$\mod 827293847003885557 = 909556943$
909556943^2		$\mod 827293847003885557 = 827293832559505249$
909556943^3		$\mod 827293847003885557 = 98715155588290468$
909556943^4		$\mod 827293847003885557 = 162073037159014500$
909556943^5		$\mod 827293847003885557 = 362947893031370513$
909556943^6		$\mod 827293847003885557 = 448963170571387818$
909556943^7		$\mod 827293847003885557 = 772887992060989965$
	⋮	
909556943^{1006}		$\mod 827293847003885557 = 792676866866748139$
909556943^{1007}		$\mod 827293847003885557 = 51766899375757845$
909556943^{1008}		$\mod 827293847003885557 = 718652652618405908$
	⋮	
909556943^{p-2}		$\mod 827293847003885557 = 369739325141372446$
909556943^{p-1}		$\mod 827293847003885557 = 1$
	⋮	
$909556943^{(p-1)x+1}$		$\mod 827293847003885557 = 909556943$
	⋮	
	?	

It would take $\sim \mathcal{O}(p) \sim \mathcal{O}(\underbrace{2^{\log_2 p}}_{N \sim 60 \text{ bits}}) \sim \mathcal{O}(10^{18})$ attempts
to extract the **exponent** from the **remainder**!

$$\boxed{\{ \text{anything} \}^{(p-1) \cdot [\text{ANYTHING}] + 1} \mod p = \{ \text{anything} \}}$$

A *Public* Scheme—Public-Key Cryptography!

(Diffie, Hellman, Merkle, 1977) (*Alice*, *Bob*, *Eve*, 200■)

$$(\mu^\alpha)^\beta \bmod p = (\mu^\beta)^\alpha \bmod p$$

- *Alice* & *Bob* *publicly* agree on part of a **key** = a huge prime # p ,

e.g., $p = 827293847003885557$

- ... and *Alice* & *Bob* *publicly* agree on another part = a huge # μ ,

e.g., $\mu = 909556943$

-
- Now *Alice* *privately* chooses her sub-key $\alpha = ?$ and calculates and *publishes* $A = \mu^\alpha \bmod p$... e.g.,

$$909556943^\alpha \bmod 827293847003885557 = \underbrace{754904643945497026}_{\text{Eve cannot determine } \alpha!} \equiv A$$

- Now *Bob* *privately* chooses his sub-key $\beta = ?$ and calculates and *publishes* $B = \mu^\beta \bmod p$... e.g.,

$$909556943^\beta \bmod 827293847003885557 = \underbrace{719753132956248328}_{\text{Eve cannot determine } \beta!!} \equiv B$$

-
- Lastly, *Alice* determines *the private key* using her α via $B^\alpha \bmod p$

& *Bob* determines *the same private key* using his β via $A^\beta \bmod p$
... e.g.,

$$719753132956248328^\alpha \bmod p = 754904643945497026^\beta \bmod p$$

$$= \boxed{51766899375757845} \equiv \text{private Key} !!!$$

Eve cannot deduce this!!!

↓
Lucifer

DES



Example₃ of Arithmetic modulo (*prime* × *prime'*)

μ	$p = 7 \quad \& \quad q = 5$		$\mu^{\text{exponent}} \bmod (35)$
	exponent	period $\leq (p-1)(q-1) = 24$	
→ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25			
1 1			
1 2 4 8 16 32 29 23 11 22 9 18 1 2 4 8 16 32 29 23 11 22 9 18 1 2			
1 3 9 27 11 33 29 17 16 13 4 12 1 3 9 27 11 33 29 17 16 13 4 12 1 3			
1 4 16 29 11 9 1 4 16 29 11 9 1 4 16 29 11 9 1 4 16 29 11 9 1 4			
1 5 25 20 30 10 15 5 25 20 30 10 15 5 25 20 30 10 15 5 25 20 30 10 15 5			
1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6 1 6			
1 7 14 28 21 7 14 28 21 7 14 28 21 7 14 28 21 7 14 28 21 7 14 28 21 7			
1 8 29 22 1 8 29 22 1 8 29 22 1 8 29 22 1 8 29 22 1 8 29 22 1 8 29 22 1 8			
1 9 11 29 16 4 1 9 11 29 16 4 1 9 11 29 16 4 1 9 11 29 16 4 1 9			
1 10 30 20 25 5 15 10 30 20 25 5 15 10 30 20 25 5 15 10 30 20 25 5 15 10			
1 11 16 1 11 16 1 11 16 1 11 16 1 11 16 1 11 16 1 11 16 1 11 16 1 11			
1 12 4 13 16 17 29 33 11 27 9 3 1 12 4 13 16 17 29 33 11 27 9 3 1 12			
1 13 29 27 1 13 29 27 1 13 29 27 1 13 29 27 1 13 29 27 1 13 29 27 1 13			
1 14 21 14 21 14 21 14 21 14 21 14 21 14 21 14 21 14 21 14 21 14 21 14			
1 15			
1 16 11 1 16 11 1 16 11 1 16 11 1 16 11 1 16 11 1 16 11 1 16 11 1 16			
1 17 9 13 11 12 29 3 16 27 4 33 1 17 9 13 11 12 29 3 16 27 4 33 1 17			
1 18 9 22 11 23 29 32 16 8 4 2 1 18 9 22 11 23 29 32 16 8 4 2 1 18			
1 19 11 34 16 24 1 19 11 34 16 24 1 19 11 34 16 24 1 19 11 34 16 24 1 19			
1 20 15 20 15 20 15 20 15 20 15 20 15 20 15 20 15 20 15 20 15 20 15 20 15 20			
1 21			
1 22 29 8 1 22 29 8 1 22 29 8 1 22 29 8 1 22 29 8 1 22 29 8 1 22			
1 23 4 22 16 18 29 2 11 8 9 32 1 23 4 22 16 18 29 2 11 8 9 32 1 23			
1 24 16 34 11 19 1 24 16 34 11 19 1 24 16 34 11 19 1 24 16 34 11 19 1 24			
1 25 30 15 25 30 15 25 30 15 25 30 15 25 30 15 25 30 15 25 30 15 25 30 15 25			
1 26 11 6 16 31 1 26 11 6 16 31 1 26 11 6 16 31 1 26 11 6 16 31 1 26			
1 27 29 13 1 27 29 13 1 27 29 13 1 27 29 13 1 27 29 13 1 27 29 13 1 27			
1 28 14 7 21 28 14 7 21 28 14 7 21 28 14 7 21 28 14 7 21 28 14 7 21			
1 29 1 29 1 29 1 29 1 29 1 29 1 29 1 29 1 29 1 29 1 29 1 29 1 29 1 29 1 29			
1 30 25 15 30 25 15 30 25 15 30 25 15 30 25 15 30 25 15 30 25 15 30 25 15 30			
1 31 16 6 11 26 1 31 16 6 11 26 1 31 16 6 11 26 1 31 16 6 11 26 1 31			
1 32 9 8 11 2 29 18 16 22 4 23 1 32 9 8 11 2 29 18 16 22 4 23 1 32			
1 33 4 27 16 3 29 12 11 13 9 17 1 33 4 27 16 3 29 12 11 13 9 17 1 33			
1 34 1 34 1 34 1 34 1 34 1 34 1 34 1 34 1 34 1 34 1 34 1 34 1 34 1 34 1 34			

Relatively prime to $pq = 35$

Not Relatively prime to $pq = 35$

The “Perfect” Scheme: An *Asymmetric* Public/Private Key

(Ellis < 1970, Cocks & Williamson \leq 1974; Diffie 1975)

(Rivest, Shamir, Adelman, 1977)

Consider again ...

$$\{\text{anything}\}^{(p-1) \cdot [\text{ANYTHING}] + 1} \bmod p = \{\text{anything}\}$$

1) Alice picks **TWO** huge primes, p & q , and defines

$$K = p \times q$$

2) Alice notes that

$$\{\text{anything}\}^{(p-1)(q-1) \cdot [\text{ANYTHING}] + 1} \bmod (pq) = \{\text{anything}\}$$

She picks any huge α & β that satisfy

$$\alpha \cdot \beta = (p - 1)(q - 1) \cdot [\text{ANYTHING}] + 1 \quad *$$

which is always possible if $\gcd((p - 1)(q - 1), \beta) = 1$.

3) Alice *publishes* her Public Key = $\{K, \beta\}$

without, however, revealing p & q !

* * * * * *It's practically impossible to factor $K = p \times q$* * * * * *

4) Alice *keeps secret* her Private Key = $\{\alpha\}$

5) Since now $\{\text{Message}\}^{\beta \alpha} \bmod K = \{\text{Message}\}$...

[E] Bob sends Alice an **RSA-encrypted** message

$$\boxed{\text{Plain Text}} \xrightarrow{\text{digitize}} \left\{ \boxed{\text{Plain Text}} \right\}^\beta \bmod K \equiv \boxed{\text{Cipher Text}}$$

[D] ... which Alice—and *only* Alice—can *decrypt*:

$$\left\{ \boxed{\text{Cipher Text}} \right\}^\alpha \bmod K = \boxed{\text{Plain Text}} !!!$$

How to Attack RSA Encryption?

Find an **EFFICIENT** algorithm to factor public key $K = p \times q$

\exists algorithms to factor large numbers K , e.g., with $N \equiv \log K$ $\gg 128$ bits?
storage size

• Primitive: Eve tries every $n = 2, 3, \dots, \sqrt{K} \implies$

$$\tau_N = K^{1/2} = \exp\left[\frac{1}{2} \log K\right] = \exp\left[\frac{1}{2}N\right] \text{ steps}$$

$$\text{which is } \text{INEFFICIENT!!} \iff \begin{cases} \tau_N \sim \mathcal{O}(K^a) \sim e^{aN} \sim e^{\#\text{ digits}} \sim \#\text{ values} \\ \tau_N > \mathcal{O}(\text{poly}[N]) \sim \text{poly}[\#\text{ digits}] \end{cases}$$

• Best for $N > 400$ bits is “Number Field Sieve”:

$$\tau_N \sim K^{(\log \log K / \log K)^{2/3}} \sim \exp\left[N^{1/3} (\log N)^{2/3}\right]$$

which is **INEFFICIENT!!**

- Hmm. Knowing $\{K=pq, \beta\}$ **EFFICIENTLY** implies $\{\alpha\} \star \dots$
- Note that Eve **does** have the factors p & q of $K = p \times q$ in hand
if she can solve this **EFFICIENTLY** for μ :

$$\boxed{\mu^2 \bmod K = 1}$$

because

$$(\mu + 1)(\mu - 1) \bmod (pq) = 0 \implies (\mu + 1)(\mu - 1) = pq \cdot x = (py_1)(qy_2)$$

$$\implies \begin{cases} \mu = +1 \bmod (pq) & = 1 \quad (\text{trivial}) \\ \mu = -1 \bmod (pq) & = pq - 1 \quad (\text{trivial}) \\ \mu = p \cdot y_1 - 1 & \& \mu = q \cdot y_2 + 1 \quad \star \\ \mu = p \cdot y_1 + 1 & \& \mu = q \cdot y_2 - 1 \quad \star \end{cases}$$

$$\star \implies \boxed{\gcd(\mu \pm 1, pq) = p} \quad \boxed{\gcd(\mu \mp 1, pq) = q}$$


• Finding greatest common divisor via Euclid's algorithm **is EFFICIENT**:

$$\tau_N \sim \log K = N \sim \mathcal{O}(\text{poly}[N]) \text{ steps}$$

• **SO??**

Qu[antum]bits

Bit **b**



vs.


Qubit **|q>**

$$\begin{Bmatrix} |0\rangle \\ |1\rangle \end{Bmatrix}$$

Store: **b** = 0 | 1

—2 possibilities

Operation: SWITC~~H~~



Measure: only **0** | **1**

Store: **|q>** = cos ϑ |0> + e $i\varphi$ sin ϑ |1>

— ∞ possibilities ($0 \leq \vartheta, \varphi < 2\pi$)

Operation: UNITARY EVOLUTION

$$|q\rangle \rightarrow |q'\rangle = \hat{U}|q\rangle \rightarrow \hat{U}^\dagger|q'\rangle = |q\rangle$$

Measure: only **|0> |1>** ... or **|0'> |1'>**


CLASSICAL

**SUPERPOSITION
INTERFERENCE**

Single-qubit operations include “Hadamard transformation” $\hat{U} = \hat{H} = \hat{U}^\dagger$

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} |0\rangle \rightarrow \hat{H}|0\rangle \equiv |+\rangle = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle) \\ |1\rangle \rightarrow \hat{H}|1\rangle \equiv |-\rangle = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle) \end{array} \right\} \quad \hat{H} \doteq \begin{smallmatrix} |0\rangle & |1\rangle \\ \langle 0 | & \langle 1 | \end{smallmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 \\ 1 & -1 \end{pmatrix} / \sqrt{2}$$

which effectively (i) rotates a spinor about \hat{y} by 90° , or (ii) passes a spinor through a *half-silvered mirror* in, e.g., a *Mach-Zehnder Interferometer*:



Quantum Computation₀

Entangled Quantum State $|\Psi\rangle$ of two or more qubits \equiv

A coherent state in which it is impossible to assign a definite state to any one of its qubits.

—cf. quantum “non-locality,” Bell’s inequalities, EPR, ...

E.g., for 2 qubits:

$$|\Psi\rangle_{12} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}} [|\mathbf{0}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{1}\rangle_2 + e^{i\varphi} |\mathbf{1}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_2]$$

Quantum Computation on qubits $|\mathbf{q}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{q}\rangle_2 \cdots |\mathbf{q}\rangle_N$ is accomplished via

i One-qubit unitary transformations: $\dots, \hat{U}_i |\mathbf{q}\rangle_i, \dots$ ($\mathbf{q} = \mathbf{0} | \mathbf{1}$)

i Two-qubit unitary transformations: $\dots, \hat{U}_{i \neq j} |\mathbf{q}\rangle_i |\mathbf{q}\rangle_j, \dots$

i Multi-qubit unitary transformations: $\hat{U} \underbrace{|\mathbf{q}\rangle_{N-1} \cdots |\mathbf{q}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{q}\rangle_0}_{\text{Register}}$

⇒ **Exponential gain in the capacity of information stored and in the efficiency of simultaneous information processing**

$\begin{smallmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \end{smallmatrix}$ Massively Parallel Computation $\begin{smallmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \end{smallmatrix}$

..... *BUT* ... only N qubits of data can be read/observed.

Nevertheless, the *effect* of all that information storage and processing on *a few* carefully chosen variables CAN be observed by exploiting *entanglement*, allowing one to infer a *correct result* after n trials with

$$\boxed{\text{Probability } 1 - \epsilon^n \xrightarrow[0 < \epsilon < 1]{} 1^-}$$

Any computational algorithm can be implemented on a *Turing Machine*, or on a *Quantum Turing Machine*.

But **Quantum Computation** does not expand what is POSSIBLE
— Only What is PRACTICAL.

Quantum Computation₁ — One Qubit

One-qubit unitary transformations

Can be built up **EFFICIENTLY** to arbitrary accuracy $\epsilon \gtrsim 0$, in $\sim \mathcal{O}(1/\epsilon)$ steps, from a *finite basic set* of unitary transformations (in practice, ≥ 2).

E.g., employ **Rabi flopping** between the 2 states

$$\boxed{\left| \mathbf{0} \right\rangle \xleftrightarrow{\hbar\omega} \left| \mathbf{1} \right\rangle}$$

Jaynes-Cummings model atom + microcavity photon field

$$\{ |g, n\rangle, |e, n-1\rangle \} \equiv \{ |\mathbf{0}\rangle|\mathbf{n}\rangle_C, |\mathbf{1}\rangle|\mathbf{n-1}\rangle_C \} \dots$$

L λ A, RWA, near-resonance $\hbar\omega \implies t$ -evolution:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} |\mathbf{e}, n-1; t\rangle = \left[\cos\left(\frac{1}{2}\Omega_{n,\omega}t\right) + i\frac{\Delta_\omega}{\Omega_{n,\omega}} \sin\left(\frac{1}{2}\Omega_{n,\omega}t\right) \right] |\mathbf{e}, n-1\rangle \\ \quad - \frac{\Omega_{Rn}}{\Omega_{n,\omega}} e^{+i\varphi} \sin\left(\frac{1}{2}\Omega_{n,\omega}t\right) |\mathbf{g}, n\rangle \\ \\ |\mathbf{g}, n; t\rangle = \left[\cos\left(\frac{1}{2}\Omega_{n,\omega}t\right) - i\frac{\Delta_\omega}{\Omega_{n,\omega}} \sin\left(\frac{1}{2}\Omega_{n,\omega}t\right) \right] |\mathbf{g}, n\rangle \\ \quad + \frac{\Omega_{Rn}}{\Omega_{n,\omega}} e^{-i\varphi} \sin\left(\frac{1}{2}\Omega_{n,\omega}t\right) |\mathbf{e}, n-1\rangle \end{array} \right.$$

$$\text{Vacuum Rabi flopping freq. } \Omega_R \equiv \sqrt{8\pi\hbar\omega L^{-3}} \left| q \langle \mathbf{g} | \mathbf{r} \cdot \hat{\mathbf{e}} | \mathbf{e} \rangle \right| / \hbar, \quad \varphi \equiv \arg \langle \mathbf{g} | \mathbf{r} \cdot \hat{\mathbf{e}} | \mathbf{e} \rangle \text{ (POLARIZATION)}$$

$$n\text{-photon res. flopping freq. } \Omega_{Rn} \equiv \sqrt{n} \Omega_R$$

$$\text{Detuning } \Delta_\omega \equiv \omega - \omega_0, \quad \omega_0 \equiv (E_e - E_g) / \hbar$$

$$\text{Dressed eigenfrequency } \Omega_{n,\omega} \equiv \sqrt{\Omega_{Rn}^2 + \Delta_\omega^2} = \sqrt{n\Omega_R^2 + (\omega - \omega_0)^2}$$

For $\Delta_\omega = 0$ & $n = 1$, on-resonance atom/single-photon-**entangling pulses**:

$$\Omega_{Rn}t = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \pi \stackrel{\text{Split}}{\implies} |\mathbf{e}, 0\rangle \xrightarrow[\pi/2]{} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}} \left[|\mathbf{e}, 0\rangle - |\mathbf{g}, 1\rangle \right], \quad |\mathbf{g}, 1\rangle \xrightarrow[\pi/2]{} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}} \left[|\mathbf{e}, 0\rangle + |\mathbf{g}, 1\rangle \right]$$

$$\Omega_{Rn}t = 1 \cdot \pi \stackrel{\text{Flip}}{\implies} |\mathbf{e}, 0\rangle \xrightarrow[\pi]{} -|\mathbf{g}, 1\rangle, \quad |\mathbf{g}, 1\rangle \xrightarrow[\pi]{} +|\mathbf{e}, 0\rangle$$

$$\Omega_{Rn}t = 2 \cdot \pi \stackrel{\text{Fermion}}{\implies} |\mathbf{e}, 0\rangle \xrightarrow[2\pi]{} -|\mathbf{e}, 0\rangle, \quad |\mathbf{g}, 1\rangle \xrightarrow[2\pi]{} -|\mathbf{g}, 1\rangle$$

Quantum Computation₂ — Two Qubits — Entanglement!


Two-qubit unitary transformations

Can be built up **EFFICIENTLY** . . . ; e.g.,

$$\hat{U}_{i \neq j}^{(\text{CNOT})} |\mathbf{q}_i\rangle_i |\mathbf{q}_j\rangle_j = |\mathbf{q}_i\rangle_i |(\mathbf{q}_i + \mathbf{q}_j) \bmod 2\rangle_j$$



		C[ontrolled]NOT gate	
		$ 0\rangle_t$	$ 1\rangle_c$
		$ 0\rangle_c 0\rangle_t$	$ 0\rangle_c 1\rangle_t$
$ 0\rangle_c$			
	$ 1\rangle_c$	$ 1\rangle_c 1\rangle_t$	$ 1\rangle_c 0\rangle_t$

An EXAMPLE of *entanglement* . . . of two qubits via a cavity:



CNOT gate for 2-qubit states $|\mathbf{q}\rangle_{\text{control}} |\mathbf{q}\rangle_{\text{target}} \equiv |\mathbf{q q}\rangle$:

$$\begin{array}{cccc} |\mathbf{0 0}\rangle & |\mathbf{0 1}\rangle & |\mathbf{1 0}\rangle & |\mathbf{1 1}\rangle \\ \langle \mathbf{0 0}| & \left(\begin{array}{cccc} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{array} \right) & = \frac{1}{2} \underbrace{\left(\begin{array}{cccc} 1 & -1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & -1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \end{array} \right)}_{(+\pi/2)_1} \underbrace{\left(\begin{array}{cccc} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & -1 \end{array} \right)}_{\text{IF } \mathbf{q}_1 = \mathbf{q}_2 = 1} \underbrace{\left(\begin{array}{cccc} 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & -1 & 1 \end{array} \right)}_{(-\pi/2)_1} \end{array}$$



Quantum Computation₃ — Many Entangled Qubits

Multi-qubit unitary transformations \hat{U}_f

Can ALWAYS be constructed **EFFICIENTLY** from 1- & 2-qubit ones
 from 1-qubit pulses & **CNOT** gates!!

⇒ **Massively parallel computation**—exponential speedup!

Prepare and operate on an N -qubit **INPUT “register”** in this initial state:

$$\begin{aligned} |\Psi_0\rangle &= \hat{H}_{N-1} \dots \hat{H}_1 \hat{H}_0 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_{N-1} \dots |\mathbf{0}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_0 = \prod_{i=0}^{N-1} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}} (|\mathbf{0}\rangle_i + |\mathbf{1}\rangle_i) \\ &= 2^{-N/2} \left[|\mathbf{0}\rangle_{N-1} \dots |\mathbf{0}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_0 + \dots \left\{ \begin{smallmatrix} \text{all } 2^N \text{ N-bit} \\ \text{binary } \# \# x \end{smallmatrix} \right\} \dots + |\mathbf{1}\rangle_{N-1} \dots |\mathbf{1}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{1}\rangle_0 \right] \end{aligned}$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{Computation } f(x) : \quad \hat{U}_f |\Psi_0\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^N}} \hat{U}_f \left(\sum_{\substack{\text{binary} \\ x=0}}^{2^N-1} |x\rangle \right) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^N}} \sum_{\substack{\text{binary} \\ x=0}}^{2^N-1} |f(x)\rangle$$

To get **Entanglement** between x and $f(x)$, prepare also an N -qubit **OUTPUT “register”** in a reference state, e.g., $|\mathbf{0}\rangle = |\mathbf{0}\rangle_{N-1} \dots |\mathbf{0}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_0$, now

$$\hat{U}_f |\Psi_0\rangle |\mathbf{0}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^N}} \hat{U}_f \left(\sum_{\substack{\text{binary} \\ x=0}}^{2^N-1} |x\rangle |\mathbf{0}\rangle \right) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^N}} \sum_{\substack{\text{binary} \\ x=0}}^{2^N-1} |x\rangle |f(x)\rangle$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\hat{U}_{\text{CNOT}}^{[N=2]} \frac{1}{2} \left[|\mathbf{0}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_0 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_0 + |\mathbf{0}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{1}\rangle_0 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_0 + |\mathbf{1}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_0 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_0 + |\mathbf{1}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{1}\rangle_0 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_0 \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \left[|\mathbf{0}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_0 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_0 + |\mathbf{0}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{1}\rangle_0 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{1}\rangle_0 + |\mathbf{1}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_0 |\mathbf{1}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{1}\rangle_0 + |\mathbf{1}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{1}\rangle_0 |\mathbf{1}\rangle_1 |\mathbf{0}\rangle_0 \right] \\ &= \hat{U}_{\underline{10}}^{(\text{CNOT})} \hat{U}_{\underline{11}}^{(\text{CNOT})} \hat{U}_{\underline{00}}^{(\text{CNOT})} \frac{1}{2} \left[|\mathbf{0}\rangle |\mathbf{0}\rangle + |\mathbf{1}\rangle |\mathbf{0}\rangle + |\mathbf{2}\rangle |\mathbf{0}\rangle + |\mathbf{3}\rangle |\mathbf{0}\rangle \right] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \left[|\mathbf{0}\rangle |\mathbf{0}\rangle + |\mathbf{1}\rangle |\mathbf{1}\rangle + |\mathbf{2}\rangle |\mathbf{3}\rangle + |\mathbf{3}\rangle |\mathbf{2}\rangle \right] \end{aligned}$$

Quantum Factoring Algorithm of Peter Shor (1994)

0) *NB.:* To crack an **RSA**-encrypted message, solve $\boxed{\mu^2 \bmod K = 1}$.

If we can find any number y with $\gcd(y, K) = 1$ and **even period r** , then

$$\boxed{y^r \bmod K = 1 \implies \mu = y^{r/2} \bmod K}$$

1) To factor K with $N \sim \log_2 2K^2$, set an N -qubit register to initial state

$$|\Psi_0\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^N}} \sum_{x=0}^{2^N-1} |x\rangle$$

and another N -qubit register to initial $|\mathbf{0}\rangle$ (all $\mathbf{0}$'s).

2) Pick a **random** number $y < K$. Simultaneously—**EFFICIENTLY**—quantum-compute the numbers $f(x) = \{y^x \bmod K\}$ in the 2nd register, thereby **entangling** them with the numbers $\{x\}$ in the 1st register:

$$|\Psi\rangle = \hat{U}_f |\Psi_0\rangle |\mathbf{0}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^N}} \sum_{x=0}^{2^N-1} |x\rangle |f(x)\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^N}} \sum_{x=0}^{2^N-1} |x\rangle |y^x \bmod K\rangle$$

All results are here!! — How to extract periodicity r of $y^x \bmod K$???

3) We can at once find ALL numbers x that have some COMMON but **random** value $z = y^{x_0 + \lambda r} \bmod K$ by simply measuring 2nd register and finding whatever state $|z\rangle$. This leaves 1st register in quasi-periodic superposition

$$|\psi_{x_0}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{L}} \sum_{\lambda=0}^{L \approx 2^N/r} |x_0 + \lambda r\rangle, \quad 0 \leq x_0 < r.$$

We don't care about the shift x_0 —only the **periodicity r** , so ...

4) ★★★ Compute Discrete $\boxed{[\mathcal{F}ast] \mathcal{F}ourier \mathcal{T}ransform of |\psi_{x_0}\rangle}$ ★★★

Quantum \mathcal{FFT} is **EFFICIENT**—involves 1-qubit \hat{H} 's and 2-qubit rephasing transformations, yields: $\mathcal{FFT}|\psi_{x_0}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{r}} \sum_{j=0}^{r-1} e^{2\pi i x_0 j / r} |j(2^N/r)\rangle$

5) By repeating above measurements n times, \mathcal{FFT} converges to invariant even period r of some y with probability $\gtrsim \mathcal{O}([1/2N]^n)$.

An Example of Factoring via Shor's Algorithm

0) FOR EXAMPLE, let $p = 5$ & $q = 7$, solve $\boxed{\mu^2 \bmod 35 = 1}$.

If we can find any number y with $\gcd(y, 35) = 1$ and even period r , then

$$\boxed{y^r \bmod 35 = 1 \implies \mu = y^{r/2} \bmod 35}$$

1) To factor 35 with $N = 11$ ($2^{11} - 1 = 2047$), set 11-qubit registers to initial

$$|\Psi_0\rangle|0\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^N}} \sum_{\substack{\text{binary} \\ x=0}}^{2047} |x\rangle|0\rangle$$

2) Pick a *random* number $y < 35$. Simultaneously—**EFFICIENTLY**—quantum-compute the numbers $\{f(x) = y^x \bmod 35\}$ ($x=0, \dots, 2047$), thereby entangling **INPUT** and **OUTPUT** registers:

$$|\Psi\rangle = \hat{U}_f |\Psi_0\rangle|0\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^N}} \sum_{x=0}^{2047} |x\rangle|f(x)\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^N}} \sum_{x=0}^{2047} |x\rangle|y^x \bmod 35\rangle$$

E.g., for $\boxed{y = 9}$ (which has periodicity $r = 6$):

$$\begin{aligned} |\Psi\rangle \propto & |0\rangle|1\rangle + |1\rangle|9\rangle + |2\rangle|11\rangle + |3\rangle|29\rangle + |4\rangle|16\rangle + |5\rangle|4\rangle \\ & + |6\rangle|1\rangle + |7\rangle|9\rangle + |8\rangle|11\rangle + |9\rangle|29\rangle + \dots + |2046\rangle|1\rangle + |2047\rangle|9\rangle \end{aligned}$$

3) Measure *random* $|z\rangle$ of **OUTPUT** register (random $z = y^x \bmod 35$), leaves **INPUT** register in a quasi-periodic superposition of $\{|x\rangle\}$ with $x = x_0 + \lambda r$; e.g., a measurement of $\boxed{|z\rangle = |11\rangle}$ leaves $x_0 = 2$, ($\lambda=0, \dots, 340$):

$$|\psi_{x_0=2}\rangle \propto |2\rangle + |8\rangle + |14\rangle + |20\rangle + \dots + |2036\rangle + |2042\rangle$$

4)
$$\boxed{\mathcal{FFT}|\psi_{x_0=2}\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{6..}} \left[|0\rangle + e^{1 \cdot 2\pi i x_0 / 6} |340\rangle + e^{2 \cdot 2\pi i x_0 / 6} |680\rangle + e^{3 \cdot 2\pi i x_0 / 6} |1020\rangle + e^{4 \cdot 2\pi i x_0 / 6} |1360\rangle + e^{5 \cdot 2\pi i x_0 / 6} |1700\rangle + e^{6 \cdot 2\pi i x_0 / 6} |2040\rangle \right]}$$

5) Repeated measurement of this state (*any* $0 \leq x_0 \lesssim r$) determines

$$\boxed{r = 6} \implies \mu = y^{r/2} \bmod 35 = 9^3 \bmod 35 = \boxed{29 = \mu} \implies \boxed{p = 5, q = 7}$$

Alice & Bob & Eve Redux
