



# **CS3191 Section 1**

## *Introduction to Games*

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- **Games and evolution.** Games used to model the evolution of traits.

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- a **game tree** (required for the formal definition of game);
- a **strategy**;
- a **pay-off function**;
- the **normal form** of a game.

# What is a game?


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
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A **game** gives the **rules** for the interactions of the participating entities, the **players**.

# Example




# A game tree




The nodes in such a tree are the **positions** of the game.

# A game tree



At each node it has to be clear whose **turn** it is.


# A game tree



The bottom nodes in the tree, the **leaves**, are the **final positions** of the game. This is where we note the **result**.




# A game tree



Note that different positions in the tree can correspond to the **same** constellation on the board.

# A game tree



That is because in a tree, given a **position** we can reconstruct the **path** from the root leading to it (and thus the play of the game). Another **path** is shown. Taking trees instead of graphs makes our lives easier.

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- (b) Could you draw a game tree for **Paper-Stone-Scissors**? If not, why not?
- (c) Consider the following simple game between two players:  
Player 1 has a coin which he hides under his hand, having first decided whether it should show head or tail. Player 2 guesses which of these has been chosen. If she guesses correctly, Player 1 pays her 1 quid, otherwise she has to pay the same amount to him. Could you draw a game tree for this game? If not why not?

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- **Simultaneous moves.** Our notion of game tree doesn't seem to allow for several players to move simultaneously.

We will see how to deal with these issues later. For now we assume that all our games are of **complete (or perfect) information**, that is, each player knows precisely where in the game tree they are.

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The person who has to eat the poisonous square loses.


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
The person who has to eat the poisonous square loses. The resulting game is known as  $(m \times n)$ -Chomp.

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


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


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





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**Question.** Which player would you rather be, 1 or 2?

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What would make the games more exciting, and why aren't we looking at those issues?

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$$9 \times 8 \times \cdots \times 2 \times 1 = 9! = 362880$$

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- for each of the branches from such a node there is a label giving the **probability** of that move occurring.

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To make it simpler, we assume here that the defender has only one army to defend the country with.

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
We want to find out whether it is better to attack with one or with two armies.

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
Probabilities for throwing two dice:  $1/9$  for each branch where the two numbers agree,  $2/9$  where they differ.

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


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
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
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
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
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
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# Risk-Attack with 1

## Attack with 1




We want to calculate with which probability  $A$  will win. For that, we first have to calculate the probability for each outcome (that is, each **leaf**) of the tree. For that, we have to **multiply** the probabilities along the path. So every branch has a **probability** of  $1/9$ . In order to find the probability for  $A$  to win, we have to **add** the **probabilities for all the paths where  $A$  wins**. This gives

$$1/9 + 1/9 + 1/9 = 3/9 = 1/3,$$

so Attacker wins in  $1/3$  of all cases.

# Risk-Attack with 2


## Attack with 2



We again calculate the **probabilities** for the leaves by **multiplying** the probabilities along the corresponding paths.

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


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


We again calculate the **probabilities** for the leaves by **multiplying** the probabilities along the corresponding paths. Again, we **add** up the **probabilities for those occasions where  $A$  wins**, and get

$$\frac{1}{27} + \frac{2}{27} + \frac{1}{27} + \frac{2}{27} + \frac{2}{27} + \frac{1}{27} + \frac{2}{27} + \frac{2}{27} = \frac{13}{27} \approx 0.48.$$

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Since this is bigger than  $1/3$ , it is better for Attacker to attack with 2 armies. (And, in fact in general for Risk the chance of winning an encounter increases with the number of committed armies.)

# Adding imperfect information

In order to describe card games, for example, we need to have a way of incorporating the idea of **imperfect information** into game trees.

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**Question.** Why do we make that a requirement?

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In other words, we can cover simultaneous moves by using imperfect information.


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


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


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
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
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
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Player 1 has the choice between three moves. Player 2 **cannot distinguish between those**. Player 2 has three choices for each of these positions, but they are **the same in each case**. We mark the **winner** for each possible play.

# Games: Addition to definition

Here is a reminder of our definition of game.

**Definition 1** A *game* is given by

- a finite set of *players*,
- a finite *game tree*,
- for each node of the tree, a *player whose turn it is in that position* and
- for each final node and each player a *pay-off function*. (We will ignore this part of the definition for the moment.)

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- the moves from one of the nodes in the information set are indistinguishable from the moves from any other such node.

# Strategies

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
Note that nothing in this notion of strategy says that I have to follow some sort of **principle!** In particular I am allowed to choose **different moves** to make in positions which look **the same on the board**, but have different histories.

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


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In the notes, the same strategy is displayed something like this.


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
It is Player 1's turn at the start, so he has to **choose a move**.






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
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
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
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
# Example

Question. How many possible outcomes (final positions) does playing in accord with this strategy have?



# Example

**Question.** How many possible outcomes (final positions) does playing in accord with this strategy have? How many are advantageous to Player 1?



# Strategies: towards a definition

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Also note that we force a strategy to make a choice of a move if it is the chosen player's turn—we do not allow 'give up by refusing to make a move'. If we want giving up to be an option, we have to make it a move in the game tree.

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We can turn this observation into a definition.

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
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
# Different strategies

How many strategies are there for Player 1 in  $(2 \times 2)$ -Chomp?



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
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
If we remember that Player 1 starts the game and they then move alternately, we can think of the game tree for  $(2 \times 2)$ -Chomp like this:



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
Player 1 chooses the left-most move.



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
Player 1 chooses the second move from the left.



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
Player 1 chooses the third move from the left.



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
Player 1 chooses the right-most move. But that means there are further choices down the line! Two decision points with two choices each, that gives  $2 \times 2 = 4$  strategies.



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




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
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
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That makes **seven** strategies altogether.

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
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We consider strategies for Player 2 of Paper-Stone-Scissors.




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


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


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We consider strategies for Player 2 of Paper-Stone-Scissors. Lastly she may choose to show  $S$  for scissors.






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These are **all** the strategies for Player 2 in Paper-Stone-Scissors. Again they show that Player 2 cannot use information she does not have; her moves for two nodes in the same information set are the same.


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So she has the same choices as Player 1, preserving the symmetry of the game as it is defined informally. So we really have not changed the game by using *via* a game tree.

# Generating all strategies

Let's assume we are given a game tree  $t$  and are trying to generate all strategies for Player  $X$ . This can be done **recursively**. (Note that when the game is not of perfect information then the following considerations have to be changed accordingly.)

# Generating all strategies


Let's assume we are given a game tree  $t$  and are trying to generate all strategies for Player  $X$ . This can be done **recursively**.

- There are **no moves**: There is only the 'do nothing' strategy for each player.

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
- There are **no moves**:
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




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
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
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Note that this **does** account for chance moves.

# Counting all strategies

Let's assume we are now trying to count all strategies for Player  $X$  for game  $t$ . This can also be done **recursively**, with the number of strategies for Player  $X$  on game  $t$  being denoted by  $N_X(t)$ . (Note that when the game is not of perfect information then once again the following considerations have to be changed accordingly.)

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
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


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
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


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
If there are chance moves involved, then we get **several** paths ending in several leaves, together with a probability for each leaf that it will occur. The probability for a leaf to occur is calculated by multiplying the probabilities occurring along the unique path leading to it. The probabilities for all the possible leaves will add up to one.

# Playing strategies against each other

We have a look at an example to show how playing one strategy against another works.

# Playing strategies against each other


Here is a **strategy** for  $(2 \times 2)$ -Chomp for **Player 1**.






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
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Here is a **strategy** for  $(2 \times 2)$ -Chomp **for Player 1**. And here is a **strategy** for the same game **for Player 2**. And here they are **together**. The outcome of playing the one against the other is **immediately obvious**.



# Why bother?

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This is quite hopeless for games like Chess and Go, or even Checkers, simply because the game tree is far too big to hold in a computer—and we've just got some idea of how the number of strategies grows with the size of the game tree!

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Hence when we talk about **small games** we mean games which are amenable to an analysis *via* strategies. They will keep us busy for quite a while, maybe longer than you'd thought. This is the most **mathematical** part of the course.



# Games *via* strategies

We take the idea of presenting games *via* their strategies to its logical conclusion.

# Games *via* strategies

If there are just two players, and no elements of chance involved, then we can present a game in the form of a **matrix**. We list the strategies for Player 1 along the rows and those for Player 2 along the columns, and record in the centre the outcome of playing the one against the other.

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			<i>P</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>
	<i>P</i>				
1	<i>R</i>				
	<i>S</i>				

# Games *via* strategies

In Paper-Stone-Scissors, Player 1 and 2 have three choices each which we can encode as follows. We record the result as

- **1**: win for Player 1
- **2**: win for Player 2
- *D*: draw.

			2	
		<i>P</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>
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1	<i>R</i>		<b>2</b>	<i>D</i>	<b>1</b>
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	<i>S</i>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<i>D</i>	

Games given likes this are known as **matrix games**.

# Question

**Question.** How would you give a matrix version of our miniature Risk game?




# Games *via* strategies–chance

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Recall the miniature Risk game we looked at earlier: Player 1 can only choose between the strategies 'attack with 1' and 'attack with 2', while Player 2 has only one strategy. But there are plenty of possible outcomes for either strategy.



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However, if all our outcomes are given as **numbers** then we can calculate an **expected number** as the outcome of playing one strategy against another.

If, for each player and each outcome of the game, we have a **number** to indicate what the outcome means for this player, then we can turn every game into a matrix.

# Pay-off functions

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**Definition 1** A *game* is given by

- a finite set of *players*,
- a finite *game tree*,
- for each node of the tree, a *player whose turn it is in that position* and
- for each final node and each player a *pay-off function*.

# Example

Assume that for Paper-Stone-Scissors the loser pays the winner one (pound, point, chocolate bar), and the pay-off is 0 for both if the game ends in a draw. Then the pay-offs for this game for Player 1 are as follows.

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1	<i>R</i>		-1	0	1
	<i>S</i>		1	-1	0



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		2		
		<i>P</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>
1	<i>P</i>	0	1	-1
	<i>R</i>	-1	0	1
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		2		
		<i>P</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>
1	<i>P</i>	(0, 0)	(1, -1)	(-1, 1)
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**Question.** What would happen if there were more than 2 players?

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		2		
		<i>P</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>
1	<i>P</i>	0	1	-1
	<i>R</i>	-1	0	1
	<i>S</i>	1	-1	0

		2		
		<i>P</i>	<i>R</i>	<i>S</i>
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Zero-sum games with two players are particularly easy to describe: If we give the pay-off function for one player, we just have to multiply it with  $-1$  to get the pay-off function for the other player.

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Hence in such a case it is sufficient to give just the one matrix, which normally is that for Player 1. In fact, whenever we give a game by just such a matrix, the implicit assumption is that we are describing a 2-person zero-sum game.

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Some of the most interesting games are non zero-sum. We will see plenty of examples in this course, in particular since most of the known techniques do not work as well for these kinds of games.

# Example

We now consider how to incorporate chance into turning a game into its matrix form.

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
We now consider how to incorporate chance into turning a game into its matrix form.

Consider the following game between two players. **Player 1** rolls a three-faced die. If **he** throws 1 **he** pays two units to **Player 2**. If **he** throws 2 or 3, **Player 2** has a choice. **She** can either choose to pay one unit to **Player 1** (**she** stops the game) or **she** can throw the die. If **she** repeats **Player 1**'s throw, **he** has to pay her two units. Otherwise **she** pays him one unit. The game tree is given below, with the pay-off being given for **Player 1**.


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


# Example



**Player 1** has only one strategy (he never gets a choice). **Player 2** has four strategies (**she** can choose to throw the die or not, and is allowed to make that dependent on **Player 1**'s throw). We can encode her strategies by saying what **she** will do when **Player 1** throws a 2, and what **she** will do when **Player 1** throws a 3, stop (*S*) or throw the die (*T*). So *S|T* means that **she** will stop if **he** throws a 2, but throw if **he** throws a 3. The matrix will look something like this:


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		2			
		$S S$	$S T$	$T S$	$T T$
1					


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What are the expected pay-offs for the outcome of these strategies?




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**Case  $S|S$ .** For each of the possible outcomes of playing this strategy, take the probability that it will occur and multiply it with the pay-off, then add all these up.


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**Case  $S|S$ .** For each of the possible outcomes of playing this strategy, take the probability that it will occur and multiply it with the pay-off, then add all these up. Hence we get

$$(1/3 \times (-2)) + (1/3 \times 1) + (1/3 \times 1) = 0.$$

# Example




What are the expected pay-offs for the outcome of these strategies?

Case  $S|T$ .

$$(1/3 \times (-2)) + (1/3 \times 1) + (1/9 \times 1) + (1/9 \times 1) + (1/9 \times (-2)) = -3/9 = -1/3.$$

# Example




		2			
		$S S$	$S T$	$T S$	$T T$
1		0	$-1/3$	$-1/3$	

What are the expected pay-offs for the outcome of these strategies?

**Case  $T|S$ .** This is a symmetric variation of case  $S|T$ , and the pay-off is the same.

# Example



	2			
	$S S$	$S T$	$T S$	$T T$
1	0	$-1/3$	$-1/3$	$-2/3$


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Case  $T|T$ .

$$(1/3 \times (-2)) + (1/9 \times 1) + (1/9 \times 1) + (1/9 \times (-2)) + (1/9 \times 1) + (1/9 \times 1) + (1/9 \times (-2))$$

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# Example



	2			
	$S S$	$S T$	$T S$	$T T$
1	0	$-1/3$	$-1/3$	$-2/3$

**Question.** Which player would you rather be in this game?

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We are now ready to state and prove the only result of this introductory section.

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**Theorem 1.1** *Consider a game with two players, 1 and 2, of perfect information without chance, which can only have three different outcomes: **Player 1** wins, **Player 2** wins, or they draw. Then one of the following must be true.*

- (i) **Player 1** has a strategy which allows him always to win;*
- (ii) **Player 2** has a strategy which allows him always to win;*
- (iii) **Player 1** and **Player 2** both have strategies which ensure that they will not lose (which means that either side can enforce a draw).*



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If a player has a strategy which allows him to always win, no matter what the other player does, we call that strategy a **winning strategy**. Then we can restate the theorem by saying that in such a game, it is the case that either one of the players has a winning strategy or that they can both enforce a draw.

# Proof

Induction over the height of the game tree.

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**Base case:** The height is 0. Then the result must be stated with the only node, win for **Player 1**, win for **Player 2** or draw, and the Theorem is obviously true.

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
Induction over the height of the game tree.

**Induction hypothesis:** We can label the root of a game tree of height at most  $n$  with a number which indicates which case occurs. We use 1 if **Player 1** can force a win,  $-1$  if **Player 2** can force a win and 0 if both sides can enforce a draw.

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Induction step.



Let  $t$  be a tree of height  $n + 1$ .


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Let  $t$  be a tree of height  $n + 1$ . By the induction hypothesis we can label the roots of the game trees reached by making a first move of  $t$  with a number (say  $l_i$  for tree  $t_i$ ) as follows:


- it bears label  $l_i = 1$  if **Player 1** wins the game rooted there;
- it bears label  $l_i = -1$  if **Player 2** wins the game rooted there;
- it bears label  $l_i = 0$  if both sides can enforce a draw in the game rooted there.



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
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
There is a tree labelled 1. So there is a  $1 \leq i \leq k$  with  $l_i = 1$ . Then by making move  $m_i$  **Player 1** can ensure that he will win the subsequent game  $t_i$  (because he has a winning strategy there), and thus the overall game  $t$ . Hence  $t$  gets label 1.



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
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There is no tree labelled 1, but one labelled 0. So  $l_i \leq 0$  is true for all  $1 \leq i \leq n$  and  $l_i = 0$  for one particular  $i$ . Then by making the first move  $m_i$  **Player 1** transforms the game into  $t_i$ , where he can ensure a draw.

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
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There is no tree labelled 1, but one labelled 0. So  $l_i \leq 0$  is true for all  $1 \leq i \leq n$  and  $l_i = 0$  for one particular  $i$ . Then by making the first move  $m_i$  **Player 1** transforms the game into  $t_i$ , where he can ensure a draw. But the fact that all the trees have a label of at most 0 means that **Player 2** can enforce at least a draw in all games  $t_1, \dots, t_k$ , and thus in the game  $t$  no matter what **Player 1**'s first move is. So  $t$  gets label 0.

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
There is no tree labelled 1, but one labelled 0.

All trees are labelled  $-1$ . Then no matter which first move  $m_i$  **Player 1** makes, **Player 2** can enforce a win in the subsequent game  $t_i$ . Hence she can enforce a win in  $t$  and it gets label  $-1$ .

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The case where **Player 2** makes the first move is analogous.

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